Hello all
I am here because I am interested in improving the New Zealand MMP system. In particular I want to address the problem of wasted votes that result from application of the 5% threshold. Those wasted votes create perverse incentives and make enemies of allied parties. I am proposing that voters be given a second choice of party vote. If the first does not pass the threshold, the vote goes to the second. Easy done, and eliminates the problems. Lowering the threshold becomes much less important.
See ott.nz or onthethreshold.nz. (Two addresses, one website)
I think that many thresholds in electoral systems work the same way. A second choice is easy to understand and to implement. I'm looking for advice, comments, even support maybe.
frenzed
@frenzed
Retired New Zealander living in France.
Worked as electrical engineer in electricity distribution.
Into cycle touring.
Best posts made by frenzed
-
Hello from Ed Hitchcock, New Zealander in France
Latest posts made by frenzed
-
RE: Hello from Ed Hitchcock, New Zealander in France
@rob It is a nice idea to dislike parties, but in my view they are necessary. We need politicians to work in cooperation in groups, because the other option is dictatorship.
The problem in the US (and in many jurisdictions) is that the elections system freezes out all but two estalished parties.
The solution (for me) is a system with lower barriers to entry for new parties, and one which allows smaller parties with dispersed support to gain representation.
MMP does that very effectively. New Zealand's implementation of it works well, except that I suggest that a second choice of party vote would improve it.
-
RE: Problems with vote-discarding thresholds, esp in MMP
@keith-edmonds Thank you for your reply.
The idea is not that the voter identify their two favourite parties.
The question for the second choice is:
If your first choice party does not pass the threshold, to which other party should your vote go? (Just as with one choice, if for your second choice you choose a party that does not meet the threshold, your vote does not count in allocating seats)
This is a second choice offered in order that:
- A voter for a small party may also participate in seat allocation, irrespective of whether his preferred party passes the threshold.
- The true level of support for small parties may be known, and not influenced by strategic voting.
- Small parties do not act as spoliers. With one choice, small parties take votes from allied parties, and then see those votes go to waste.
- There are reduced barriers to the entry of new parties.
- The result is very close to proportional amongst votes for qualifying parties.
It is designed so that the voting paper requires minimal change, and vote counting is minimally more complex.
When measuring party support, mutliple ranked choices are not needed. Choose one (of the threshold passing parties) does the job.
This change acknowledges that parties are an essential part of national politics, allows smaller parties, and reduces barriers to entry. Parties need to present widely acceptable groups of candidates. If they don't, other parties can rise to take their place. And barriers to entry have been lowered.
MMP directly measures party support, so I do not see much value in scoring parties. MMP has the issue of overhangs not yet well-solved, but otherwise is well-liked in NZ. There is no mood to change from MMP.
-
RE: Hello from Ed Hitchcock, New Zealander in France
@marylander Thank you for your comments. I share your concerns about preferential systems. vote counting can be slow and complex.
My proposal is for one second choice, that depends only on the count of first choice votes. This keeps things simple. Early counts of first choices usually make clear which are the threshold passing parties. Sometimes there will be something close, in which case counting will need to provide for both possibilities.
Once you have the threshold information, the results for each voting place are quite independent, and results for groups of voting places just involve addition of vote numbers.
In the NZ context fast vote counting is essential. Except in rare cirumstances a final result is expected on election night.
In general I do not like preferential systems. A second choice is easily done, provided the criterion is easily determined. But more complex preferences that depend on district-wide totals are to me a nightmare.
Regards
Ed
(my first detailed reply, I cannot see your message to check I have responded to all the points you make) -
RE: Hello from Ed Hitchcock, New Zealander in France
@marylander Thank you for your welcome.
And the comment about the title.
As we all know, appearances are often more influential than content. I will look for a solution....
Ed -
Getting to exact proportionality
First I'd like to note that Proportional representation may mean proportional to anything. The US house of Reps says that it uses 'PR' because representation is aimed at being proportional to population. (Ignoring that DC, PR (puerto rico this PR), and territories have no voting representation.)
Often I fear that 'proportional' is a must-have in new electoral systems. For many the solution is to add -PR to the name of a system, and voilà.
In this thread I want to talk about systems that measure party support directly and allocate seats numbers in proportion to that directly measured party support, and aim for 'exact' proportionality. List-PR and MMP are the main candidates here I think.
Thresholds and rounding are two obstacles to exact proportionality that are often found in PR systems that aim for exact proportionality.
Systems that ask voters to directly choose voters are often criticized for giving parties too much power. However the reality is that parties have an important role in bringing like-minded people together to form governments, and are powerful in any system.
For me, a central issue is the avoidance of barriers to entry for new parties. It is the possible rise of new parties that keeps the existing ones honest. So for me we should also value voting systems with low-enough barriers to entry.
I am of course leading the discussion towards my idea...
This is to give voters a second choice of party vote. It means that every voter can express a wish to vote for a new party, but still has a useful vote in the event that the new party fails to pass the threshold.
With such a system, every voter can vote for a party that has enough support to wins seats. Proportionality can be very close to exact. The perverse incentives created by vote-discarding thresholds are eliminated. And support for new parties is easily seen and measured, and turns into seats when large enough. Oh, and it is very easy to understand and implement. And you can retain a threshold.
I have been working on this for a long time. It is a current issue in NZ, where a 2012 review of MMP acknowledged the threshold as a problem, but did not find a good solution. There is another review under way at present.
I have a website at www.ott.nz with more details
I would very much appreciate feedback and suggestions.
Here is how the modified voting paper might look
And here is the detailed results table
-
Problems with vote-discarding thresholds, esp in MMP
When thresholds exist for the purpose of limiting small parties, and when they work by discarding votes for small parties, they create perverse incentives for voters and parties alike.
Voters do not like voting for small parties because their vote is wasted and plays no part in decidig the makeup of the assembly. And often in MMP, in NZ esecially, the balance between left and right can be close. A vote for a small party is a vote lost to that party's allied parties. So small parties have no friends.
So the solution is to give the voter a second choice of party vote.
By doing that every voter can express support for a smallnew party and still have a say in the overall result. More details at ott.nz. -
Hello from Ed Hitchcock, New Zealander in France
Hello all
I am here because I am interested in improving the New Zealand MMP system. In particular I want to address the problem of wasted votes that result from application of the 5% threshold. Those wasted votes create perverse incentives and make enemies of allied parties. I am proposing that voters be given a second choice of party vote. If the first does not pass the threshold, the vote goes to the second. Easy done, and eliminates the problems. Lowering the threshold becomes much less important.
See ott.nz or onthethreshold.nz. (Two addresses, one website)
I think that many thresholds in electoral systems work the same way. A second choice is easy to understand and to implement. I'm looking for advice, comments, even support maybe.