RCV IRV Hare
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Yeah. Everyone, including Fairvote, emphasizes that electoral systems change campaign behavior and voting behavior. There is no realistic scenario in which you change voting systems and all other behavior in the system stays. Discussing that artificial situation is only useful as a conceptual exercise in comparing some particular point in the math or something, not as an assertion about counterfactual situations.
There's no possibility that single-choice plurality voting in Burlington 2009 would have this 3-way race as it was. All the media and voters and everyone (candidates included) would have come to some pre-election idea of Montroll or Kiss as the primary non-Republican and the other as dangerous spoiler. They would have had that argument. And the result would be likely Montroll winning but maybe Kiss or even the Republican and then all the spoiler-blame fall-out. There's NO chance it would have avoided all those well-known dynamics.
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@wolftune we are in complete agreement here.
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Here are some notes of what I heard @Sass say in his interactive session of 2022-08-23.
Factions are "competitive" if there is enough support for them that they could conceivably win. When there are factions within a party, Sass says, there are usually just two, the moderate faction and the more extreme faction. He says that we rarely see elections in the US with more than two factions, because people are used to that count, which results from use of Choose-one Voting.
Now in Alska, you have Peltola, Palin, and Begich. Predicts Palin will win, and thinks she is not the Condorcet winner, per polling. With choose-one, the Republicans would strategically vote for Begich instead of Palin. So Sass predicts that the result will be that a more divisive candidate wins under RCV IRV Hare than would under Choose One.
When voters only have one mark they can make on their ballot, they look for a bandwagon to jump on so they don’t waste it. This increases the relative importance of money and fame in elections because those are the most obvious signs of a bandwagon. The scarcity of power that voters have causes them to tactically make the safest choice they can to be the most effective with that limited power.
Peltola, Begich, and Palin
Yup’ik Eskimo
(f)Sass points out that the CES polling shows that voters want to support multiple candidates.
Sass says that a precinct in Texas or rural Wyoming would not have the grasp of tech to publish the cast-ballot data over the Internet.
You should be able to rank all the candidates if you want to.
Raynaud system.
Sass thinks in the case of 4 or more candidates, equal-ranking systems do not escape Arrow.
Ranked Robin does not pass Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. But Sass thinks this is a matter of degree, and it might not be that important. Clone candidates help each other.
Condorcet systems are "usually" monotonic, but all fail participation.
"Tournament-style Borda" is equivalent to the tiebreaker in Ranked Robin.
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@jack-waugh said in RCV IRV Hare:
So Sass predicts that the result will be that a more divisive candidate wins under RCV IRV Hare than would under Choose One.
I find that one particularly unlikely, although it is not clear if this means "if the whole election was under choose-one from the beginning" vs. looking at the RCV ballots after the fact, and counting only first choices choose-one style.
Still, I think it's a stretch to say RCV would elect a more divisive candidate than choose-one. Overall I think Sass's bias against RCV is out of proportion with its actual real-world flaws.
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@rob said in RCV IRV Hare:
So Sass predicts that the result will be that a more divisive candidate wins under RCV IRV Hare than would under Choose One.
This prediction is not supported by real-world data. In fact, the opposite seems to be true.
Research shows that the claim that IRV alters incentives and campaign dynamics in ways that appear to decrease negative campaigning and increase campaign civility is mostly supported at the local level, and furthermore, early evidence is promising that IRV makes primaries work better in avoiding polarizing candidates.
Thus far, primaries that use RCV have generally produced “consensus” candidates, affirming expectations that RCV can have a moderating effect on primaries, or at least have the effect of blocking the path of more polarizing candidates who might have enough base support to win under plurality rules.Another apparent advantage to using RCV in the primary process is that because RCV encourages sincere (as opposed to strategic) voting, ranked ballots in party primaries can more clearly demonstrate factions’ relative priorities and voting power than traditional single-mark ballots, thereby giving party leaders, who will need to unify those factions around the party nominee (and in the long term keep their big tents together and safe from a hostile takeover), a better sense of how and with whom to bargain for future cooperation.
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@andy-dienes Yes, I'll add clarification to my statement.
I don't think IRV inherently elects more polarizing candidates than Choose-one Voting because of its mechanics. What I've seen is that in the US right now, because of the way IRV is sold, after it's implemented somewhere, candidate (exit) strategy and voter strategy decreases (at least initially). That would cause either method to elect more polarizing candidates, and I'm pointing in particular to (rare) IRV elections like Burlington, VT 2009 and this ongoing Alaska Special General Election with 3 distinct front-runners. As voters and candidates better figure out IRV, I would expect it to "reduce" mostly back to Choose-one Voting with similar candidate and voter strategy. The transparency and familiarity of Choose-one Voting helps it to "stabilize".
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@sass said in RCV IRV Hare:
. As voters and candidates better figure out IRV, I would expect it to "reduce" mostly back to Choose-one Voting with similar candidate and voter strateg
I will caution you that this expectation is contradicted by the available evidence, which indicates that RCV does lower the barriers to running, and may even encourage more, and more diverse, candidate entry, as theory suggests. I'm not sure how long-term you're expecting this effect to require, but the research studies this article cites span a period of decades of use in Bay Area cities.
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OK, it looks like Peltola won.
