Borda Modified
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Consider a modification to the Borda Count, where we would permit equal-ranking. Skipped ranks would still be either forbidden or insignificant. I'm not necessarily proposing this system for advocacy, but want to understand its characteristics better as it may have been proposed as a tiebreaker to a Copeland-type system.
Would this modification solve the known problems with the Borda Count, when it is evaluated through the lens of wanting to defeat vote splitting?
Would this modified Borda Count tend to promote divisive candidates?
Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].
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@jack-waugh How would the equal rankings be handled?
Also, you may want to look at the Nanson and Baldwin methods. They are Condorcet methods based on Borda that use an elimination process.
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The score for each candidate is the sum over that candidate's scores relative to the other candidates.
The score of A relative to B is the count of voters who prefer A over B minus the count of voters who prefer B over A.
