Biproportional representation as a means to prevent bullet voting
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I got an impression that in proportional approval voting, at least some voters might be incentivized to bullet vote for candidates who live nearby. Some level of biproportionality may remove this incentive.
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@matija Single-candidate bullet voting is generally a bad strategy, regardless of whether you use singly proportional or biproportional representation. In theory, it might work in some situations; if your constituency is extremely small, with a quota under one seat, it might be possible for you to eke out one seat you wouldn't win otherwise. However, most of the time, the opposite will happen: constituencies entitled to multiple candidates will only be able to elect a single one if they try bullet-voting for a single candidate.
Moreover, predicting which of these two situations will occur is extremely difficult, and becomes more unpredictable for larger constituencies (i.e. only the very smallest parties, typically eliminated by thresholds, could actually try to game the system this way).
In practice, it's almost impossible to coordinate something like this because of how narrow the margin for error is. Proportional representation systems based on Webster's method are practically immune to strategic voting, even if they could be manipulated by some kind of hivemind intelligence in theory.
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@lime I was talking about bullet voting with the goal of gaining a representative who lives nearby.
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@matija Ahh, I think I understand what you meant better now. Still, I'm not sure where the incentive for bullet voting comes from (at least in a realistic situation); approval thresholding is a more common (and more realistic) strategy for informed voters.