"Problematic" Ballot Exhaustion examples - RCV IRV

masiarek

We need three small, illustrative elections to demonstrate each ‘problematic’ box separately (avoid ‘Less Problematic’ Exhausted Ballots).

Assumptions:

ranking limit 3 (or 5 if easier to re-create)
number of candidates 5 (or less if easier)
all voters correctly rank all the ballots (no spoilers, no bullet voting)
all voters rank all ranks within Ranking Limit (3 or 5)

Context:

Comments, feedback - very much appreciated!

Sass

I believe you mean "spoiled" as in "voided", not "spoiler".

With your assumptions, some of the "middling" problems can't happen because every voter fully filled out their ballot correctly. Basically the red and yellow boxes become the same.

Regardless, this exercise is fairly trivial once you wrap you head around the basic approach, which I'm happy to walkthrough

First off, all ranked ballots have an imaginary "last rank" that isn't shown on the ballot. For example, if I can only rank 3 candidates explicitly, then in practice I can explicitly rank all candidates if there are up to 4 of them because unranked candidates are considered ranked 4th. So, given your assumptions, if we want to create these kinds of problems, we need at least 2 more candidates than the number of ranks on the ballot. 3 ranks and 5 candidates is perfect.

Next up, we just make a ballot set that produces RCV results where no candidate is within a couple votes of beating another candidate. Here's one with little thought:

40: A>B>C
30: D>E>B
20: C>A>D
5: E>B>A

Now we run through the tally.

B, E, and C are all eliminated in the first round. All 25 votes transfer to A. A beats D 65 to 30. Looking back, I guess we need to make sure it comes down to a number of finalists no more than the difference between the number of candidates and the number of available ranks (so 5-3=2), which happened in this case.

Now, we add a voter who ranked all 3 of those eliminated candidates.

40: A>B>C
30: D>E>B
20: C>A>D
5: E>B>A
1: B>E>C

We also need a voter whose ballot stops transferring partway through their ranks but ultimately goes to a losing finalist. This means a losing finalist needs to be in the middle of their marked rankings. The only losing finalist is D and there are only 3 explicit ranks available, so the ballot needs to rank first a candidate who gets eliminated, then rank second D, and then rank third ideally a candidate who also lost, but the third rank could really be any candidate because RCV is nonmonotonic.

40: A>B>C
30: D>E>B
20: C>A>D
5: E>B>A
1: B>E>C
1: B>D>C

Boom. Those last two ballots show the problems you're looking for.

Of course, another voter intent issue in RCV is nonmontonicity, which this ballot set doesn't show. Again, it'd be fairly easy to come up with a ballot set that shows all of the problems (my TikTok series does that), but nonmontonicity is probably best presented in isolation because of how screwy it is. The following is the simplest ballot set demonstrating nonmontonicity in RCV:

8: A>B>C
7: C>B>A
6: B>A>C

If 2 C voters strategically rank A first, then A would lose.

And that's it.

cfrank

@masiarek hm I feel like a small demonstration of the issue under consideration might be helpful. To me, I already think IRV is questionable because it fails Condorcet and participation (these are mutually exclusive criteria), is not monotonic, and uses a very strict non-compensatory method to screen out candidates.

Masiarek--

I encourage yous to sink the "RCV" referendum in November. I've posted, & written in individual-email, many arguments about FairVote's fraudulent promotion of "RCV". I emphasize that I'd like for yous to use any & all of those "RCV"-fraud arguments, in any media, entire or in part. I hope that some of my arguments can help sink "RCV" in November.

As you know, my criticism of "RCV" is about the fraudulent promotion.

Forget about exhausted-ballots. My brief Hare-definition doesn't even mention anything related to it.

"RCV" has an objective problem too, of course, It has a strategy-problem, strategy-riddenii-ness, sucker-vulnerability that the good Condorcet methods like RP(wv) or MinMax(wv) don't have.

Hare could work okay, but it's necessary that it be enacted by people who know what they're getting, ,,,who know what it is, & what it will do, & like what it is & will do, Then it will work,

But FairVote's blatantly, intentiionally dishonest promotion, lying to people about what they're getting what it is & what it will do, is the exact opposite of what is needed for Hare to work successfully,

If the people who vote to enact it know what it is & does, & likes & wants that, then I have no complaint about Hare.

It's different from Condorcet. It has a different standard, & makes a different guarantee,
'
Condorcet guarantees the election of the CW, & the consequent guarantee that every one of everyone's preference-votes will be counted & honored. Does that sound familiar? FairVote guarantees that iyour vote for 2nd-choice over last choice will be counted. It's a lie. FairVote is guaranteeing a Condorcet guarantee for "RCV"

Offered as what it is, instead of what it isn't, I have no criticism of Hare.

As I said, Hare has a valid & worthwhile guarantee too, It guarantees that if there's a Mutual-Majoritym then Hare will always elect the favorite candidate of the largest faction of the Mutual-Majority,

The Mutual-Majority is the majority-size set of voters who all prefer all the top-favotites of all of them to everyone else.

There's never more than one Mutual-Majority. There isn't always one, but it seems to me that there usually will be. I don't know how often there isn't one, but it seems to me that it won't be often.

It won't elect an unliked middle CW. It has a different guarantee.

I prefer Condorcet to Hare, because, though it's true that sometimes it would be better to elect the favorite of the largest faction of the Muitual-Majority, rather than an unliked middle CW....the IRVists are forgetting something,

They're forgetting about Hare's strategy-problem,, That problem might not manifest significantly in an electorate who have enacted Hare with full understanding of & liking for what Hare will do...an electorate who won't be lesser-evil suckers.

Maybe the problem won't manifest, but freedom for lesser-evil favorite-burial is so important, that I prefer Condorcet., Electing the CW--even an unliked one--really is necessary to fully get rid of strategy problems.

I like Hare for voting on a pizza-topping or a movie-choice, For public political elections, I'd rather have Condorcet, among the rank-methods,

...&, even though Hare's problem is avoidable if voters will use it well, the dishonest promotion disqualifies the "RCV" proposal,

Lime

@masiarek said in "Problematic" Ballot Exhaustion examples - RCV IRV:

We need three small, illustrative elections to demonstrate each ‘problematic’ box separately (avoid ‘Less Problematic’ Exhausted Ballots).

Really I'd just hammer IRV over and over again on participation failure. Exhausted ballots are a non-issue.

We need to find better names than "monotonicity" and "participation" that are easy to explain. Monotonicity is a complicated six-syllable word that, in everyday speech, literally means "boringness"—no wonder nobody cares. Rename it the basic @#$%ing sanity criterion.

Advertisement: a candidate is declared the winner and starts celebrating; then somebody comes up and explains they've found extra votes for the candidate, and the candidate suddenly loses. End with "Last year, Nick Begich lost the Alaska election because voting authorities thought he had too many votes. How could voting for someone make them lose? Don't let it happen here. Vote no on IRV."

Lime

@lime said in "Problematic" Ballot Exhaustion examples - RCV IRV:

Advertisement: a candidate is declared the winner and starts celebrating; then somebody comes up and explains they've found extra votes for the candidate, and the candidate suddenly loses. End with "Last year, Nick Begich lost the Alaska election because voting authorities thought he had too many votes. How could voting for someone make them lose? Don't let it happen here. Vote no on IRV."

New advertisement idea: circle of dictators at a table, bragging about how they took voting rights away from people and laughing. Suddenly, an Alaska politician stands up: "Oh, we did even better. Get this: if too many people vote for a candidate, that guy loses. Pretty great, huh?" Stunned silence. A man in uniform with a thick German accent: "that's too far." "Really?" "Ja, that's illegal in Germany."*

Voiceover: "When even the Germans are calling your system undemocratic, you have a problem. Vote no on IRV."

*Reference to BVerfG ruling on participation failures.