BTR-score
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@jack-waugh
It might still be too complex for voters without prior education. As someone immersed in these discussions, it is easy to loose sight of how little people know about voting and how many conceptual steps people have to take before understanding the method. I've argued here that it might be more useful to promote a spectrum of compatible methods (approval, score, STAR and BTR-score in this case). -
@casimir, thanks, that's a very interesting write-up.
At the end, you suggest that the equal-vote criterion would be too restrictive as a minimal standard. But all four of those systems pass it, I believe. They are additive and Frohnmayer-balancing.
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@casimir just a suggestion for your article, you might like to name the systems at the top as well and possibly give a very brief description of each. In my view you’ve addressed probably the most promising systems for reform efforts (although I personally don’t endorse STAR).
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@jack-waugh
Balance is one feature that the four methods share, but as a general minimal requirement for me to support a voting system it's to restrictive. It might exclude methods that are reasonable. On the other hand, it does even include some that are not so good in my opinion. A for-or-against variant of plurality, where you can either vote for only one, or against only one candidate, would still pass balance, but would be hardly better than plain plurality.
There has been a quite elaborate discussion about this on /r/endfptp which convinced me to remove that paragraph.@cfrank
Thanks for the feedback. I will add that to the article.
What is your reason against STAR? -
@casimir hmm I think it’s interesting as a system from the standpoint of tactical voting when nominations aren’t “adversarial,” but I worry how robust it is against strategic nominations—if parties nominate two clone candidates at a time, then it basically just becomes score with an added inefficiency. And I think score itself is fine, why not just do score? Parties are virtually guaranteed to engage in strategic nominations, because they already do right now.
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@cfrank
That's the issue that prompted me to think about related methods like BTR-score. Later however, I came across a good argument that convinced me this isn't so much of a problem. STAR becomes like score with strategic nomination, but that is the expected behavior. The main election is the score part, the runoff is there as a safe-guard and to make it compliant with laws that require a majority. Basically, the difference between score and STAR isn't that big, but practically it's easier to get STAR implemented. In the VSE simulation by John Huang, they even perform the same under "honest" and "two-sided strategic" assumptions. -
@casimir sure that makes some sense, but it also seems peculiar. STAR would double the number of candidates running, making it more difficult for voters to come to an informed understanding of the platforms of those candidates. At the same time, it would introduce a competition between the top two candidates for any party throughout the election, and who knows what kind of insanity that might induce: "We're both great, but I'm better" seems like an odd conflict to me. Or it could even be a good thing but it isn't clear.
Anyway, that's probably a conversation for a different thread, but essentially why I don't support STAR. I think BNR-score or BNR-approval would be preferable.
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@casimir, what are the grounds to say that balance, as a sine qua non requirement, is TOOOOOOOOO restrictive? I say no harm will come from making it a hard requirement. Anything noncompliant is suspicious, as having toooooooooooo much resemblance to choose-one plurality.
In response to your mention of for-or-against, let me point out that I usually argue that balance is necessary, not that it is sufficient.
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I've argued here that it might be more useful to promote a spectrum of compatible methods (approval, score, STAR and BTR-score in this case).
I have quoted your Hiveism Substack on VotersTakeCharge.us.
"Since every voter can vote for only one candidate, votes are a limited resource that candidates compete over. This turns campaigning into a zero-sum game. Candidates with similar political values must compete against each other. They split the votes, which benefits their mutual opponent."
The is a great explanation of the weakness of plurality voting.
If the is a problem, or if you would like me to change how I credit this please let me know.
Thanks, GregW
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@jack-waugh
For the purpose of the article it was more than needed. The requirement of allowing equal ratings/ranks already covers many cases. I'm unsure if it is really "too restrictive", but I also can't tell at the moment if it is necessary as a minimum requirement.@GregW
That's good. You may even remove the "Hiveism substack" in the text and just keep the foot note if this makes it more readable. -
That's good. You may even remove the "Hiveism substack" in the text and just keep the foot note if this makes it more readable.
Since every voter can vote for only one candidate, votes are a limited resource that candidates compete over. This turns campaigning into a zero-sum game. Candidates with similar political values must compete against each other. They split the votes, which benefits their mutual opponent.
Thank you, your quote helped the article, a plurality votes as a limited resource does explain some of the current rancor.
People diss voting systems that have not yet been used in public elections, even though the two systems with the most current use, plurality and IRV, have been found wanting.
