Polling Ourselves

My ballots:

(First a brief note. When a poll is discussed, & people in addition to me are interested in participating, then I proceed with that poll, regardless of how few people have indicated an intention to participate.

I proceed with the poll, however few participants it might have. A poll with more than one person interested is a poll of interest.)

Voting Systems:

Though I’m an Approvalist, & Approval is my single-winner proposal, I nonetheless approve
RP(wv), & rank & rate it above everything but Approval. That’s because RP(wv) is what I propose to people who insist on rankings.

…as many progressives do, because they’ve only heard about “RCV”.

So then I’d offer them RP(wv), as a better replacement for “RCV”.

In that sense, then, RP(wv) is one of my 2 main proposals. But I’d offer Approval 1st, & offer RP(wv) only if they insist on rankings.

So, voting-system ballots:

I combine both categories in one balloting, because I feel that, because of administration & security-auditing, the methods compare the same in both categories.

Approval set:

{Approval, RP(wv)}

Ranking:

Approval
RP(wv)
Score (100, 99, 50, 1, 0)
Score (5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0)
Score (2, 1, 0)
6.STAR
RP/Score hybrid (because of complexity & newness, & because I don’t know its merit)

Score ballots:

(100, 99, 50, 1, 0):

Approval: 100
RP(wv): 99
STAR, & RP/Score hybrid: 50

In Cardinal methods we vote by our inclination. In Score, my inclination is to vote sincerely (estimated-merit-proportional), not strategically.

Not knowing RP/Score hybrid’ s merit, I rate it middle with STAR, because I rate its likely merit closer to 50 than to 1.

I rate & rank all Score below RP(wv) & Approval, because they aren’t as good as Approval in east brief definition,; easy explanation, proposing, implementation (Approval ca have literally zero implementation-cost), administration, & security auditing.

Additionally, Score complexly loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & therefore also its unique unarbitraryness.

Among Score methods, I like the expressiveness of (100, 99, 50, 1, 0), though it didn’t give me the flexibility to distinguish RP/Score hybrid from STAR.

…with (5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0) next in that regard.

There are advantages & disadvantages to STAR’s runoff. Most important to me are the resulting FBC-failure, & the strategy-complication resulting from the runoff.

Additionally, the runoff makes STAR depart from Approvalist by two removes, instead of Score’s one.

That doesn’t double the arbitrariness—It squares it.

(5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0):

Approval: 5
RP(wv): 4
Score(100, 99, 50, 1, 0): 3
STAR, Score (5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0), Score (2, 1, 0), &
RP/Score hybrid: 2

(…to rate three near middle)

RP/Score hybrid:

Approval: 10
RP(wv): 9
Score (100, 99, 50, 1, 0): 5
Other Score methods & the hybrid: 4

Presidential candidates:

Ranking:

Stein

Approval set:

{Stein}

All the other methods:

Stein max score.

Let’s say that presidential candidates can still be nominated. If anyone else gets nomination & vote, then my approval-set would become:

{Stein, Williamson}

…& my ranking would become:

Stein
Williamson

Toby Pereira

@jack-waugh said in Polling Ourselves:

@toby-pereira I am curious to know at what points in the tally the scores might figure in (other than via the rankings derived from them).

They wouldn't in that method. The scores would be used purely to determine the ranks. But I think scores are slightly easier for a large number of candidates, and I think scores act in a small way to prevent burial of candidates (as said above).

That said, I would also nominate Smith//Score now, but it appears that it might be too late! (0 to 9 ballot)

Jack Waugh

This post is deleted!

Jack Waugh

This is to gather in one place the list of nominees.

Approval (Ossipoff, Pereira, Waugh)
Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking allowed (Ossipoff)
STAR (Ossipoff, Waugh)
Score{2, 1, 0} (Waugh)
Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0} (Waugh)
Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0} (Waugh)
0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked pairs, winning votes (Pereira)
Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot) (Pereira)
quantile-normalized score, with integer scores from 0 to 100 (Frankston)
0-9 score (Pereira)

Jack Waugh

For what to propose to the public:

  In Approval:

    1 Approval
    1 STAR
    1 Score{2, 1, 0}
    1 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}
    1 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
    1 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot)
    1 0-9 score
    0 quantile-normalized score, with integer
      scores from 0 to 100
    0 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked
      pairs, winning votes.
    0 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking
      allowed

  In STAR:

    5 Approval
    5 Score{2, 1, 0}
    5 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}
    5 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
    5 0-9 score
    4 STAR
    4 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot)
    1 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked
      pairs, winning votes.
    0 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking
      allowed
    0 quantile-normalized score, with integer
      scores from 0 to 100

  In Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}:

    5 Approval
    5 Score{2, 1, 0}
    5 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}
    5 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
    5 0-9 score
    4 STAR
    4 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot)
    1 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked
      pairs, winning votes.
    0 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking
      allowed
    0 quantile-normalized score, with integer
      scores from 0 to 100

  In Score{2, 1, 0}:

    2 Approval
    2 Score{2, 1, 0}
    2 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}
    2 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
    2 0-9 score
    1 STAR
    1 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot)
    0 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked
      pairs, winning votes.
    0 quantile-normalized score, with integer
      scores from 0 to 100
    0 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking
      allowed

  In Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}:

    100 Approval
    100 Score{2, 1, 0}
    100 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
    100 0-9 score
    099 STAR
    099 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}
    090 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot)
    001 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking),
        ranked pairs, winning votes.
    000 quantile-normalized score, with integer
        scores from 0 to 100
    000 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking
        allowed

  In 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked
    pairs, winning votes:

    9 Approval
    9 Score{2, 1, 0}
    9 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}
    9 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
    9 0-9 score
    8 STAR
    8 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot)
    1 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking),
      ranked pairs, winning votes.
    0 quantile-normalized score, with integer
      scores from 0 to 100
    0 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking
      allowed.

  In quantile-normalized score, with integer
    scores from 0 to 100:

    100 Approval
    100 Score{2, 1, 0}
    100 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
    100 0-9 score
    099 STAR
    099 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}
    090 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot)
    001 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking),
        ranked pairs, winning votes.
    000 quantile-normalized score, with integer
        scores from 0 to 100
    000 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking
        allowed

  In Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot):

    9 Approval
    9 Score{2, 1, 0}
    9 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}
    9 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
    9 0-9 score
    8 STAR
    8 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot)
    1 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking),
      ranked pairs, winning votes.
    0 quantile-normalized score, with integer
      scores from 0 to 100
    0 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking
      allowed.

  In 0-9 score:

    9 Approval
    9 Score{2, 1, 0}
    9 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}
    9 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0}
    9 0-9 score
    8 STAR
    8 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot)
    1 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking),
      ranked pairs, winning votes.
    0 quantile-normalized score, with integer
      scores from 0 to 100
    0 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking
      allowed.

  In Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking
    allowed:

    Approval
  = Score (all ranges)
  > STAR
  > Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot)
  > 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked
    pairs, winning votes.

@jack-waugh

If several people agree, it seems reasonable to allow additional nominations during the voting-period. If several favor it, it’s democratic.

There were several omissions in my ballots.

…so many that I should just re-post them in complete form.

I like 100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0 better than 100, 99, 50, 1, 0.

cfrank

I nominate quantile-normalized score, with integer scores from 0 to 100.

Jack Waugh

@toby-pereira, hwæt is Smith//Score?

Jack Waugh

@michaelossipoff said in Polling Ourselves:

allow additional nominations during the voting-period

I don't object.

@jack-waugh

Apply a Score method to the candidates in the Smith-set.

Now that I understand the hybrid, I like it, because it has exactly the same count as RP(w),
while having Cardinal ratings as input.

…giving full incentive for completely sincere estimated-merit-rating, while giving the strategy-free RP(wv) winner.

…with a completely sincerely-rated Score count, for an informational showing if likedness & popularity.

I like it. I might not replace RP(wv) with it, for simplicity reasons, but, with understanding that the count & election-winner are those of RP(wv), I might very well mention it in proposals, because it adds a guaranteed-sincere informational likedness result.

Jack Waugh

I updated the above list of the candidate voting systems. I will continue to do so, without further notice, in case additional nominations come in.

I updated my votes. I will continue to do so, without further notice, in case my opinion changes.

Toby Pereira

@jack-waugh said in Polling Ourselves:

@toby-pereira, hwæt is Smith//Score?

I did link to the wiki article, but it elects the score winner of the Smith set. So if there's a Condorcet winner, they are elected. Otherwise just top score among Smith set.

I will also nominate 0-9 score as an alternative to 0-5 score.

@jack-waugh Yes, likewise. My ballots were full of omissions.

@toby-pereira

Wouldn’t Score(0-100) be better than Score(0-9) for the RP/Score hybrid? It would have room for expression of all pairwise preferences, instead of sometimes forcing equal-rating.

I think Hybrid is great for this poll. Strategy-free RP(wv) result, but accompanied by a reliably-sincere likedness-count.

Just as EqualVote speaks of, the desire to express all pairwise preferences for the RP count will encourage sincerity for the Score ratings. I first heard that principle from EqualVote, in thei discussion of STAR.

I rank it 3rd. The reason why I don’t approve it is because, in public political elections, I like the defense strategy of never ranking someone you don’t like…to further enhance RP(wv)’s already powerful burial deterrence.

As Jack spoke of, I’ll soon re-post my ballots with the omissions fixed.

Toby Pereira

@michaelossipoff said in Polling Ourselves:

Wouldn’t Score(0-100) be better than Score(0-9) for the RP/Score hybrid? It would have room for expression of all pairwise preferences, instead of sometimes forcing equal-rating.

Possibly. I kept it at 0-9 for simplicity, but I wouldn't object to 0-100 or 0-99. (There has been debate in the past over whether 10 and 100 or 9 and 99 are better as max scores. I'm fairly unbothered by it.)

Jack Waugh

@toby-pereira, Smith // Score can be tallied with just the preference matrix total and the score totals, right? No need to bring the entire pile of ballots to a center for tallying.

Jack Waugh

I propose that for purposes of tallying the poll, we pretend we are not all voting in the same "precincts". Talliers can thereby demonstrate that it is not necessary to bring the ballots to the tallying location. We can have two pretend precincts and try to balance them more or less.

Toby Pereira

@jack-waugh said in Polling Ourselves:

@toby-pereira, Smith // Score can be tallied with just the preference matrix total and the score totals, right? No need to bring the entire pile of ballots to a center for tallying.

I don't know much about that side of things.

Lime

What's the goal with such a poll? Is it to provide information for the public, or to make some decision within this group?

Ideally I'd like to see a poll including as many economists, social choice theorists, voting reform advocates, etc. as possible with snowball sampling, and publishing all ballots together with a data analysis (rather than just a single winner or ordering). The results can be published in a paper that can be cited to support claims like "Experts generally believe system A is better than B."

Jack Waugh

@lime There is no proposal to make any formal decision within the group.

Some have proposed repeated polling and I agree with this.

I think the goal of the current one is to inform us of our aggregate attitude toward the single-winner systems, mainly as to their merits for proposing to the public for political elections. Knowing this attitude and some statistics over our votes (do they cluster?) might lead to discussions that we might otherwise not have thought to enter. I think this is valuable. Also, some of us like to describe or invent systems as intellectual curiosities, and the polls (including the current one) can help us as a group distinguish between those and the serious proposals.

I would not oppose trying to implement for a future polling, the ideal you state. You are not the first to suggest asking for votes from members of the larger voting-systems interest community going beyond just the participants in this forum.