Absolute Smith // Score
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Method:
- Eliminate all candidates outside the pairwise-absolute majority Smith set. (i.e. equal-rating candidates creates cycles between the two candidates), unless this would eliminate all candidates.
- (Optional.) Allow voters to specify second-round preferences for each candidate within the same party.
- Elect the score winner.
Behaves much like STAR, in that voters have less incentive to equal-rank several candidates (they want to make sure their favorite can beat the others). However, it maintains Favorite Betrayal.
Reason: Originally, I expected STAR's gimmick runoff not to have much of an effect on score's good behavior. But ever since @SaraWolk mentioned the possibility of candidates not having clones in the race, I keep finding more and more situations where STAR reacts catastrophically badly to party-coordinated strategy. This is really bad, because parties exist for the explicit purpose of coordinating strategy. I'll give more examples elsewhere.