@abel I suppose you could see the primary system as a bit of a gamble in this sense. You want to beat the other party, but you also want to do so with a candidate that is as popular as possible within the party. If your party is favourite to win anyway, you might be more inclined to just pick the most popular candidate within the party. If it's a closer election you might look at who is most likely to beat the other party. So there would be some balancing.
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RE: Primaries (ideal system for them and philosophy)
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RE: Should we abstain from voting? (In nondeterministic elections)
@bmjacobs OK, I think I get that. But I still don't think the graph is correct - it's giving a different measurement for a deterministic and non-deterministic systems. For non-deterministic methods, it seems to be working on the probability of getting elected, which I presume is what the "controlled winning probability" on the y axis means. But for the deterministic methods, it just gives a score of 100 if they are guaranteed to be elected and 0 otherwise.
If it's a about guaranteed election then the non-deterministic methods should give 0 across the board. If it's probabilistic, then the non-deterministic methods are correct on the graph but the deterministic ones are wrong - though there isn't an exact probability you can give as it depends on voting patterns.
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RE: Should we abstain from voting? (In nondeterministic elections)
@bmjacobs Interesting article, but a couple of things. Where does it come from that in Borda you need 2/3 of the vote to ensure a win? Also Borda and winner-takes-all systems wouldn't have the step function if there are more than two candidates. E.g. having 40% of the vote under First Past the Post will still give you the win in many elections. If it's to guarantee the win then yes, but I don't think it's clear that that's what the graph is trying to say.
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RE: Mathematics/Theory of voting
@mkeypaige A lot of those topics have Wikipedia or Electowiki pages, which describe them quite well, and there are also YouTube videos which discuss a lot of them. Some of the later stuff I wouldn't even know what they are. But I'll give you some links.
Ranked voting - Wikipedia
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Plurality system (also known as First Past the Post) - Wikipedia, CGP Grey video
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Ranked Choice Voting (also known as Instant Runoff Voting, Alternative Vote among others): Wikipedia, CGP Grey video
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Condorcet methods: Wikipedia, Carneades.org video
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Borda Count: Wikipedia, Carneades.org video
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Majority criterion: Wikipedia, Becky Moening video
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Unanimity criterion: Wikipedia article on Pareto Efficiency, Eric Pacuit video
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Condorcet winner criterion: Wikipedia, Carneades.org video
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Monotonicity criterion: Electowiki article, Becky Moening video
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IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) criterion: Wikipedia, Carneades.org video
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Manipulability: Wikipedia article on strategic voting, Katherine Heller video
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Random dictator: Wikipedia article, Carneades.org video
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Approval voting: Wikipedia, CGP Grey video
That's the first section covered. Let me know if this is useful at all and I can get some links for the others.
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RE: ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.
@jack-waugh I think anything except the minimum for unmarked candidates makes it too easy to mark bullet burials. But I don’t know.
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RE: ABC voting and BTR-Score are the single best methods by VSE I've ever seen.
How should ABC voting treat unmarked candidates?
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RE: Some Benefits Of IRV-Llull or ABC Voting
Who knows how the Gibbard theorem applies to ABC voting? In optimizing my vote, how do I take into account the stances of the other voters? Assume I know them perfectly. Do I maybe exaggerate support for a compromise candidate from D to C, with a metered probability?
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RE: Zero-knowledge encryption - using in voting methods
@masiarek this may be slightly tangential, but another consideration for the future is making sure any encryption in voting systems is also quantum secure.
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Integrity of Precinct-level Preference-Matrix
Suppose a tallying algo is enacted that requires a preference matrix. What grounds could be cited to convince the public that each precinct correctly sums up the preferences in the votes to build the precinct-level addend to the preference matrix?