Nonmonotonic methods are unconstitutional in Germany?
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I saw a post on here which said that German courts have ruled that nonmonotonic voting methods are unconstitutional.
Does anyone have more info about this?
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@isocratia
Not exactly.
Article 38 of the GG (the constitution) says: "Members of the German Bundestag shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections."
The important part is the "direct". Which is interpreted in the way that votes have to translate to outcomes in a transparent and unaltered way. e.g. no electoral college.
There was a ruling in a special case where non-monotonicity was the issue, but in this case the non-monotonicity came about through an unusual situation and was not expected. That means, the way the electoral law was intended and how it functioned where in conflict.
There was a recent report where they looked at the question if IRV would be constitutional and concluded that it would, making the argument that when non-monotonicity is expected and accepted, then it's okay (or something like that). -
@casimir interesting, I will not contend the law per se, since the law is the law. However, it can be argued very reasonably that non-monotonicity is something that is never actually an “expected” outcome from a ballot on the behalf of any rational, faithful voter.
In fact, it is directly contrary to any reasonable notion of the “expected” outcome of a ballot cast by a voter. Expectations should never be contrary to the desired consequence of the ballot that is submitted, yes? Otherwise that defeats the purpose of submitting the ballot—a rational person will not submit a ballot they expect to backfire against its intended consequence. So I really doubt that under sufficient scrutiny, any non-monotonic system would actually stand up to the phrasing of the law.
Whether or not they are unconstitutional in Germany or elsewhere, I do believe that any voting system that is not monotonic or that fails independence of clones should be considered fully improper and disqualified from being part of any official public elections. I.e. they should by all reason be illegal in that context. And perhaps actually are in spirit or will be found formally illegal in Germany.
Honestly, it’s this kind of thing that shows the need for a clear, mathematical ontology of voting systems. Words like “expected” and “secretive” and “direct” are way too vague. Voting theory is a technical field and laws about it should use the technical language of the field.
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@cfrank
I was using "expected" as from the view of the law makers. If it was a known issues while the law was made, then it has been accepted as part of the law. If it turns out that a law exhibits the problem contrary to expectation, then it's a problem.The report says in the summary (starting at page 135):
Die integrierte Stichwahl ist anfällig für einen paradoxen Sondereffekt, der Monotonieversagen genannt wird. Nicht ausgeschlossen ist nämlich, dass ein Wähler zwar für seinen bevorzugten Kandidaten stimmt, ihm aber noch mehr genützt hätte, wenn er ein ganz bestimmtes alternatives Stimmverhalten gezeigt hätte. Dieser Effekt muss sich anhand von Maßstäben beurteilen lassen, die das BVerfG für die Verfassungsmäßigkeit eines ähnlichen Paradoxes, nämlich des sog. negativen Stimmgewichts, aufgestellt hat. Dieses Paradox besteht darin, dass ein Zuwachs an Zweitstimmen für eine Partei dazu führen kann, dass dieselbe Partei gerade dadurch Mandate verliert. Das BVerfG hält dies für verfassungswidrig, es sei denn, der Effekt ist dem Wahlsystemtyp eigen und lässt sich deshalb nur durch dessen vollständigen Wechsel vermeiden. So verhält es sich hier: Der Gesetzgeber müsste auf die integrierte Stichwahl ganz verzichten, wenn er die Anfälligkeit für Monotonieversagen vermeiden wollte. Daher ist die integrierte Stichwahl mit den Maßstäben des BVerfG vereinbar.
Die integrierte Stichwahl ist auch mit dem Grundsatz der Unmittelbarkeit der Wahl vereinbar. Das BVerfG entnimmt ihm, für Wähler müsse vorhersehbar sein, wie sich die eigene Stimmabgabe auf den (Miss-)Erfolg der Kandidaten auswirken könne. Das ist bei integrierten Stichwahlen nicht in jeder Hinsicht der Fall, weil infolge der Anfälligkeit für Monotonieversagen für die Wähler nicht immer vorhersehbar ist, ob mit Blick auf das Endergebnis der Wahl paradoxerweise nicht ein ganz bestimmtes alternatives Stimmverhalten für den gewünschten Kandidaten günstiger wäre. Ein Verstoß gegen den Grundsatz der Unmittelbarkeit folgt daraus jedoch nicht, denn auch hier wirkt sich verfassungsrechtlich aus, dass die Anfälligkeit für Monotonieversagen innerhalb des Wahlsystemtyps nicht zu vermeiden ist.
In English (I highlighted the important part):
The instant runoff election is susceptible to a paradoxical special effect known as monotonicity failure. It is possible that a voter, even though they vote for their preferred candidate, could have actually benefited their candidate more by choosing a completely different voting behavior. This effect must be assessed using the criteria established by the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) for the constitutionality of a similar paradox, namely the so-called negative voting weight ["negatives Stimmgewicht"]. This paradox occurs when an increase in second votes for a party can lead to that party losing seats as a result. The BVerfG considers this to be unconstitutional unless the effect is inherent to the type of electoral system and can therefore only be avoided by completely changing the system. This is the case here: the legislature would have to abandon the integrated runoff election entirely if it wanted to avoid susceptibility to monotonicity failure. Therefore, the integrated runoff election is compatible with the standards of the BVerfG.
The instant runoff election is also compatible with the principle of directness in elections. The Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) interprets this principle to mean that voters must be able to foresee how their vote will affect the (success or failure) of the candidates. This is not always the case with integrated runoff elections because, due to the susceptibility to monotonicity failure, it is not always predictable for voters whether, paradoxically, a completely different voting behavior might be more favorable for the desired candidate with regard to the final election result. However, this does not constitute a violation of the principle of directness, as the susceptibility to monotonicity failure cannot be avoided within this type of electoral system.
I'm neither defending this view, nor IRV. But apparently, according to this report, IRV is constitutional. The GG intentionally puts almost no constraints on the voting system and therefore does not go into the weeds of voting theory.
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@cfrank said in Nonmonotonic methods are unconstitutional in Germany?:
What I mean is, it should not be the case that two rational voters with equal access to information, and who cast the exact same ballot, nevertheless conflict in their expectations about how that ballot will contribute to the electoral result. Non-monotonicity introduces unnecessary conflicts of interest. So I really doubt that under sufficient scrutiny, any non-monotonic system would actually stand up to the phrasing of the law.
Whether or not they are unconstitutional in Germany or elsewhere, I do believe that any voting system that is not monotonic or that fails independence of clones should be considered fully improper and disqualified from being part of any official public elections. I.e. they should by all reason be illegal in that context. And perhaps actually are in spirit or will be found formally illegal in Germany.I consider failing participation to be on the same level as failing monotonicity. Philosophically I'd say they are very similar, even if they tend to happen for different mathematical reasons. But because participation is a more "expensive" criterion, people tend to be less harsh on methods that fail it.
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@casimir yes I didn’t think you were defending the judgment or the system. I was just criticizing both lol.
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@casimir again this is just a criticism of the law and the judgment made about it: I still think even their reasoning (in bold) is pretty absurd. It means essentially that any system whatsoever that gets put into use is automatically constitutional, regardless of any negative or unexpected consequences, even those that directly contradict the letter of the law
So what is the point of the law? It seems only to prevent the use of unconstitutionality to enact technical voting reform.