New Simple Condorcet Method - Basically Copeland+Margins
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@sass said in New Simple Condorcet Method - Basically Copeland+Margins:
I would guess that a Borda strategy might work the best
W'pedia lists for Borda: "When a voter utilizes compromising, they insincerely raise the position of a second or third choice candidate over their first choice candidate, in order to help the second choice candidate to beat a candidate they like even less. When a voter utilizes burying, voters can help a more-preferred candidate by insincerely lowering the position of a less-preferred candidate on their ballot. "
If the system incents such strategies, it's no better than FPtP.
Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].
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@jack-waugh To me, a Borda strategy is more like filling the upper middle ranks with unknown fringe candidates. This backfires horribly when everyone does it.
I thought about it more today, though. There are five differences between my method and traditional Borda:
- The Borda calculations are performed only within the finalist set, which is extremely restrictive
- Equal ranks are allowed
- Skipped ranks are ignored
- There's no ballot completion requirement
- It uses tournament-style Borda count, which is a bit different
I think all of this combined is what allowed my method to hold up so well against Marcus' Borda strategies (which I didn't mention earlier). Regardless, the more rigorous testing, the better.
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@jack-waugh The fact that it's only a Borda count among the tied candidates matters. It would be easier to try to cheat Copeland's directly than to cheat the Borda count at the end. Although Copeland strategy and Borda strategy do have a fair bit in common.
Score Sorted Margins[100]; STAR[90]; Score[81]; Approval[59]; IRV[18]; FPTP[0]
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@marylander Very much agree that it being Borda only to resolve ties is very significant.
I'm personally of the view that being "hard to cheat" almost requires it to be Condorcet compliant. This does that, of course. I don't want to distract from this discussion to argue that point further, but I just think it needs to be said that the important things here are a) it is Condorcet and b) it is easy to explain.
I'm not a fan of the name Ranked Advantage Voting (advantage doesn't mean much to me), but I like the idea: Voters rank the candidates, choose the candidate that beats the most pairwise, if there is a tie, the highest average ranking candidate wins.
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There are two ways to relax ranking toward rating. One is to allow equal ranking, and the other is to allow skipped ranks (so they would make a difference). It would be conceivable to include either of these relaxations without the other. Include both, and you have rating rather than ranking. Your system allows equal ranking, but ignores skipping of ranks. The Arrow theorem states that ranking systems (i. e. system that relax neither restriction) cannot satisfy all of certain conditions that the theorem lists, all of which, incidentally, sound desirable. Can a system like yours, that allows equal ranking but ignores skipped ranks, meet all the conditions listed in the theorem? If not, which condition does your system fail?
Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].
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@jack-waugh It fails Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Unlike Ranked STAR, Ranked Robin (the official name of this method) is not a score method disguised as a ranked method -- that's what Ranked STAR is for. Ranked Robin fills a different need.
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Is IIA of the essence for confidence that a system is sufficiently resistant to spoiler effects or vote splitting, to be worthy of any attention based on a common goal of defeating two-party dominance and defeating the absolute control of all three branches of both levels of government by a system motivated only by quarterly corporate book profits?
Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].
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@jack-waugh I doubt full compliance with the mathematical definitions of criteria are incredibly important to the public perception of a system, because most of the public won't understand the formal definition of a criterion. IRV supporters who haven't dug too deep into voting theory will insist to you that it solves the spoiler problem.
On the other hand, when a pathological outcome occurs in practice, then people will get upset when the problem gets pointed out to them. If you talk to an IRV advocate about the "Lizard vs Wizard" race for Louisiana governor in 1991, they may well be able to see how the outcome reflects poorly on top-two runoff, yet not make the connection as to how that race reflects poorly on IRV as well.
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@jack-waugh Like most criteria, looking at Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives through a pass/fail lens is reductive. The question is how independent of irrelevant alternatives is Ranked Robin? I think the answer to that, in practice, is "enough". The finalist set (typically just 1 candidate) is based on how many other candidates are beaten. If you add a weak candidate into the mix, then all of the top candidates who would make it into the finalist set each gain exactly 1 more win, which doesn't change anything meaningful. Only when we start getting into a 2nd Degree tiebreaker (see the electowiki page) that an irrelevant alternative could realistically swing what would be an unrealistic election.
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@sass I think tiebraking rules are complex and based on intuitions, values, assumptions, (mis)understandings, personal hisorical experiences (good and bad) and this fuzziness. This makes them them very vulnerable to say bad press or campaigning of other voteting-method activists. Therefore I would prefer to adjust your method: remove all tiebraking rules and let voters vote about it on the same ballot as the main vote:
Most elections have a unique winner but sometimes ties can occur what shoud happen according to you?
1 new election
2 random selection
3 highest average ranking
4 some other tiebreak variant a
5 some other tiebreak variant branked-irv[1] ranked-condorcet[2] ranked-borda[0] cardinal-condorcet[10] cardinal-median[4] cardinal-alt[10] star[6] approval[5] score[4] choose-one[1] minimax-TD[10]
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@multi_system_fan said in New Simple Condorcet Method - Basically Copeland+Margins:
what should happen according to you?
That's an interesting proposal. I note that your example offers a selection of procedures for breaking a tie. Is the voter to choose just one of those?
Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].
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@jack-waugh yeah just simple choose one, most wins. I know in theory also ties could occur, you could argue for more expression or more complex, but I think this is fair and simple enough.
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@multi_system_fan Sounds good and maybe that can satisfy all nostalgia for FPtP.
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yeah just simple choose one, most wins
Which means that any that are similar will split the vote.
Aside from that, I get the idea of "vote for the voting method," there is a certain geeky appeal. But I think proposing that to the public would go badly. It just seems complicated and messy, and voters will prefer the status quo. We'd basically be saying "this stuff is so weird and nuanced that we'll just push that decision off to the voters on every single election," which isn't a good look.
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@rob "voting for what to do when voting-methods disagree" seems a better description.
You may be right that it seems complicated but I expect after a few election-cycles voters would relax about it and probably gravitate towards 1 or 2 favorite methods. Also I expect political parties, commentators, mathmaticians, pychologists and social desicion-scientists would become better at it gradually. Wheter you and I like it or not, voting activists and theorists disagree a lot to the point of becoming irrelavant to change. You seem to miss the opportunity to at least agree when methods agree which is very often.ranked-irv[1] ranked-condorcet[2] ranked-borda[0] cardinal-condorcet[10] cardinal-median[4] cardinal-alt[10] star[6] approval[5] score[4] choose-one[1] minimax-TD[10]
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@multi_system_fan said in New Simple Condorcet Method - Basically Copeland+Margins:
I expect after a few election-cycles voters would relax about it
Sure, but it would never get to that because it would never get adopted.
I'm all for us holding regular votes for voting methods, so after a few cycles we start to reach agreement. (hopefully)
But I think we'd be foolish to try to bring the public too far into that, especially in a way that they have to "vote for what to do when voting-methods disagree" with every election. Honestly I have a hard time imagining that most voters would even have an opinion on it, unless for some reason they were told that one method or another favored their preferred candidate.
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@rob if most voting-system innovators and activists would slowly gravitate to a single winner with good support using voting rounds then I agree with you, that would be much better.
However, I've been in this space for about 5 years and I see no signs of this at all In fact I see increasing fragmentation, polarisation, vote-splitting, many new variants that receive very little feedback and many leaving members in dissapointed way. In fact this was the reason I thought : why not push this fuzy complexity to the voters as a solition
I got one response from you, and you don't agree at all. Which is ok, but our differences illustrate my point.ranked-irv[1] ranked-condorcet[2] ranked-borda[0] cardinal-condorcet[10] cardinal-median[4] cardinal-alt[10] star[6] approval[5] score[4] choose-one[1] minimax-TD[10]
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@multi_system_fan Well our differences aren't that we disagree on methods, it is that we disagree on whether the voters should actually vote on the method with each election. That seems very different, but ok.... yeah there is fragmentation polarization and vote splitting in this community, as ironic as that seems.
I have proposed for a long time that we hold regular votes on methods. I'm currently working on building out some tools so we can do it right on this forum. It would have happened a lot quicker if I was running the forum, as I was going to do until things went off the rails, but Jack seems to be giving me access to what I need.
(here's one place were I mention it)
https://forum.electionscience.org/t/new-home-for-this-forum-community/720/49?u=robbrownI can also see a day where we hold regular votes within the forum. Like to vote for “election method of the month” or whatever. There are all kinds of creative things we can do. The reasoning for this should be obvious. One, we get to use the methods we talk about. Two, we gradually move toward consensus, rather than so much going round and round.
I've also been in the space a long time, and I agree with your frustration that things haven't happened more quickly. It's great if we keep proposing new methods, but we also have to have a good filtering process.
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@multi_system_fan Your complaint is about a technical page meant for people who want all of the details. The details will remain. When there is a page ready for marketing, then your concern can be applied to that for evaluation.
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Is the following almost as resistant to vote splitting as Ranked Robin?
Rank so many candidates as you choose. Equal ranking is permitted. Unranked candidates are assumed worst.
Each candidate's total margin is calculated as the sum over how well they did against the other candidates, as the number of voters who preferred them minus the number of voters who preferred the other candidate. The candidate with the highest total margin wins.
