@rob yeah, this is definetely an easier visual then those number-overload!
I think the easier graphics will allow more complexity in details because voters will feel they already undetsnd "enough" of it to feel good about it.
Most people don't try understanding every detail, just a good-enough-intuition.
@sass I think tiebraking rules are complex and based on intuitions, values, assumptions, (mis)understandings, personal hisorical experiences (good and bad) and this fuzziness. This makes them them very vulnerable to say bad press or campaigning of other voteting-method activists. Therefore I would prefer to adjust your method: remove all tiebraking rules and let voters vote about it on the same ballot as the main vote:
Most elections have a unique winner but sometimes ties can occur what shoud happen according to you?
1 new election
2 random selection
3 highest average ranking
4 some other tiebreak variant a
5 some other tiebreak variant b
@rob yeah, it used to be much more interesting and I would favor any ideas to make it better! My understanding of stuff is not good enough to take an other role then posting every now and then...
@rob you could be right for certain contexts like a state in the US. But I live in The Netherlands and often in these forums many assumptions are made without being aware of them.
for instance:
Good ideas!
There should be relatively long times between steps since many contributers don't look everyday on this forum.
I propose a dodgson-hare synthesis method that I really like.
It' described in a good article : http://jamesgreenarmytage.com/dodgson.pdf with this abstract:
In 1876, Charles Dodgson (better known as Lewis Carroll) proposed a committee election procedure that chooses the Condorcet winner when one exists, and otherwise eliminates candidates outside the Smith set, then allows for re-votes until a Condorcet winner emerges. The present paper discusses Dodgson’s work in the context of strategic election behavior and suggests a “Dodgson-Hare” method: a variation on Dodgson’s procedure for use in public elections, which allows for candidate withdrawal and employs Hare’s plurality-loser-elimination method to resolve the most persistent cycles. Given plausible (but not unassailable) assumptions about how candidates decide to withdraw in the case of a cycle, Dodgson-Hare outperforms Hare, Condorcet-Hare, and 12 other voting rules in a series of spatial-model simulations which count how often each rule is vulnerable to coalitional manipulation. In the special case of a one-dimensional spatial model, all coalitional voting strategies that are possible under Condorcet-Hare can be undone in Dodgson-Hare, by the withdrawal of candidates who have incentive to withdraw.
Since we are not electing individuals but a method and a method cannot withdraw itself based on informed understanding - which is essential for the high strategy-resistance of this method - an modification seems necessary. For instance: everyone get's to nominate 1 method and can withdraw this method when there's a cycle. Perhaps a few times new additions can be allowed.
@masiarek I really like a new method that takes some time to understand. It's called a dodgson-hare synthesis
see http://jamesgreenarmytage.com/dodgson.pdf
Abstract: In 1876, Charles Dodgson (better known as Lewis Carroll) proposed a committee election procedure that chooses the Condorcet winner when one exists, and otherwise eliminates candidates outside the Smith set, then allows for re-votes until a Condorcet winner emerges. The present paper discusses Dodgson’s work in the context of strategic election behavior and suggests a “Dodgson-Hare” method: a variation on Dodgson’s procedure for use in public elections, which allows for candidate withdrawal and employs Hare’s plurality-loser-elimination method to resolve the most persistent cycles. Given plausible (but not unassailable) assumptions about how candidates decide to withdraw in the case of a cycle, Dodgson-Hare outperforms Hare, Condorcet-Hare, and 12 other voting rules in a series of spatial-model simulations which count how often each rule is vulnerable to coalitional manipulation. In the special case of a one-dimensional spatial model, all coalitional voting strategies that are possible under Condorcet-Hare can be undone in Dodgson-Hare, by the withdrawal of candidates who have incentive to withdraw.
@toby-pereira https://jamesgreenarmytage.com/dodgson.pdf seems like an interesting improvement
@rob yeah, it used to be much more interesting and I would favor any ideas to make it better! My understanding of stuff is not good enough to take an other role then posting every now and then...
@toby-pereira seems a method is missing that selects randomly ballots and only compares the scores of a random pair (counting only the highest scoring as a winner of that pair).
Also including a concept like : repeat until chance of statistical unrepresentativeness becomes f.i less then 0,001%
@toby-pereira definetly agree there are some good point about random elements in a voting method. Not only because - as you say - it simplifies and achieves PR but also the psychological effect on elected candidates ("luck was part of my succes") may lead to more empathy, humbleness in their policies, and dealing with colleagues and their next campaign.
@rob I understand this problem, altough I doubt simplicity of voting methods or rationality in general will prevent this.
I'm interested in electionguard software combined with a paper-printed ballot of each vote and the possibility of online checking wheather one's (still anonymous!!) vote is actually tallied. But in this case I do see a similar problem. It's designed to enhance trust but many people would probably distrust everything. For instance because of some connection to Bill Gates.
@rob you could be right for certain contexts like a state in the US. But I live in The Netherlands and often in these forums many assumptions are made without being aware of them.
for instance:
@rob you say "The main thing I think it gets wrong is that it doesn't really account for the diminishing returns on increasing complexity. I doubt that the added complexity of minimax TD over minimax is worth it, when considering issues such as "likelihood of being adopted."
I have to disagree completely. I'm convinced :
can someone explain https://arxiv.org/pdf/2208.06907 in lay terms?