Allocated score (STAR-PR) centrist clones concern
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@wolftune said in Allocated score (STAR-PR) centrist clones concern:
Okay, so your "over 0.5" idea for "wrong" is contrasted with <0.5 being worse than "wrong" (in your words, "bad" is worse than "wrong" it seems). This is a confusing way to put things.
Haha - they were separate posts with informal language though!
As for terminology, yes, there's a question of what it means to be proportional. I don't think "everyone is equally represented" is enough. That would mean electing everyone's least favorite is still proportional. I think proportional needs to mean something like if there's a clear block of voters enough to have a quota of a seat, that block gets to elect whoever they prefer.
Arguably that means you would have to elect AB whenever C gets less than the max score. Unless you count all the voters as a single block that prefer CC to AB. But then you get the debate over what counts as preferring when you have two or more candidates. Is it correct to just add up your scores of AB and CC to determine which you prefer?
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The above examples illustrate two issues. Keep in mind that the goal of some supporters of cardinal PR is not to satisfy a strong form of Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC); but to elect one moderate centrist, and a representative for each solid coalition with a quota of supporters. This should often be an achievable goal as the number of candidates entitled to a seat under PSC is usually less than the number of seats to be filled. But by starting off with awarding a seat to the overall score winner electing a moderate is prioritized over PSC.
A second issue, seen in the second example, is that a candidate receiving only low scores can beat a candidate that is clearly entitled to a seat under PSC. This is due to a downward shift in what constitutes a neutral score as the number of seats increases. What I mean by neutral score is the minimum score that a candidate must exceed to be entitled to a seat if everyone bullet votes. This would be the corresponding score to the vote exceeded in the Droop Quota. For 0 to 5 score this would be 2.5 for a single winner election, 1 ⅔ for two winners, 1.25 for three, 1 for four, etc. For a six seat election in the above example a score of 1 isn't a low score of disapproval it's a modest score of approval.
What could be done about these issues?
1: Educate voters on strategy.
Allocated Score will achieve a proportional outcome, if all voters engage in bullet voting. Rating all candidates that the voter doesn't approve of with a score of zero is essential. The ballot options could be changed from (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) to (0, 0, 0, 3, 4, 5) to stress the point. The description of STAR-PR doesn't have the top-two runoff step of STAR so there's no incentive to use intermediate scores as it is.2: Award seats to candidates that qualify for seats based on their top scores alone first. For example: count only the ratings of 5 cast then seat the candidates that have a score of 5 times the Droop quota, following a procedure similar to the first round of PR-STV. Afterwards this would switch to Allocated Score instead of the elimination round. This should prioritize proportionality, while preserving some of the attributes of Allocated Score. Intermediary rounds could be included, counting scores of four and five and a round counting scores of three, and five in a Bucklin like manner. This would ensure that even parties that split their vote between multiple candidates would get priority over an overall score winner. There would be a confirmation process to handle surplus votes and make sure votes aren't counted twice, that would seat individual candidates sequentially, but this would fundamentally change the process from a series of single winner elections to rounds of multi-winner elections. Multiple candidates could meet the Droop quota to win the round, but the ballot deweighting process could result in not all winners being confirmed.
3: Transform the scores to adjust for the shift in the neutral point.
By adjusting the scores before they are tallied voters can score on the more familiar scale used for single winner elections and have them corrected for the distortion caused by having multiple winners.
Example: four winner election 0 to 5 ballot. The neutral score would be 1. The balance test for the equal vote criteria also changes for multi-winner. Instead of the familiar one vote canceling one vote, four votes in opposition are necessary to cancel each vote in favor(see balance test below). A score of zero remains zero, 1 becomes ⅓, 2 becomes ⅔, 3 becomes 2 ⅔, 4 becomes 3 ⅔, and 5 remains 5. Consider if four voters give a candidate a zero and one a five. Total score will be 5 and the average score will be 1. If four give a 1 and one a 4. Total score would be 4 * ⅓ + 3 ⅔ = 5 and an average of 1. If four give a score of 2 and one a 3. Total score would be 4 * ⅔ + 2 ⅓ = 5 and an average of 1. With these adjustments in place the potential harm to a preferred candidate of giving a lesser candidate an intermediate score will be on par with single winner systems.Balance Test for Score (Based on Droop Quota rather than majority, to be applicable to any number of winners) : There shall be a set of ballots of size one plus the number of seats to be filled, such that if one of the ballots is cast any way possible the other ballots can be cast to cancel out the vote leaving the average scores for each candidate unchanged. The ballots shall be scored such that, scores of approval on one of the ballots shall be countered by the opposing score of disapproval on the other ballots, and a score of disapproval shall be countered by the opposing score of approval on one of the other ballots and the score of disapproval shall be shared with the remaining ballots.
4:Only count a fraction of the votes for each candidate.
Sequential Monroe avoids the issues by only counting the top Hare quota of ballots for each candidate. With the vast majority of low scores left uncounted, the results are largely unaffected by the distortion of scores in multi-winner elections. However, with little more than the candidates core supporters contributing, the results will lean less moderate until the final round.What if STAR-PR was not a misleading name; and included an automatic top-two runoff based on all ballot preferences before each selection was finalized?
With the current version of Allocated Score if all voters make use of intermediate scores it will destroy any semblance of proportionality. If all voters resort to min-max voting to protect proportionality the runoff will be irrelevant. More likely voters most interested in getting a particular candidate or party elected or dead set against a particular candidate, will resort to min-max voting while voters torn between objectives will make use of the full range of scores. Vote splitting among min-max voters could result in parties failing to get a seat, and the voters making full use of all scores will have an outsized influence in getting their lesser evils elected.
Score based PR systems have the potential to provide a balance between different interests. With some of the above changes in place, parties with a quota of supporters should get one of their top two candidates elected, even if they split their votes between multiple candidates, but could end up with the one preferred by voters overall, rather than the one preferred by party members.
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@k-shenefiel said in Allocated score (STAR-PR) centrist clones concern:
For a six seat election in the above example a score of 1 isn't a low score of disapproval it's a modest score of approval.
I object to the entire premise that any of these voting systems say anything about approval/disapproval. I want "approval voting" changed to "choose-any voting". Except for a system like 3-2-1 that asks about approval explicitly, all these systems of rating and ranking are relative. Voters might approve of all or none of the candidates. We can only discuss "preference".
The idea of encouraging bullet voting and not using low scores seems to me to show the whole system to be flawed rather than be a solution. It's a bad workaround at best.
The description of STAR-PR doesn't have the top-two runoff step of STAR so there's no incentive to use intermediate scores as it is.
That's a problem IMO. At the very least, this undermines the credibility of the label "STAR-PR".
Award seats to candidates that qualify for seats based on their top scores alone first. … Afterwards this would switch to Allocated Score instead of the elimination round. … [the rest of your suggestion 2]
That seems (by first impression) to be a potential real solution.
Your suggestion 3 might make mathematical sense, but I think it's too complex for public-perception to go well.
My inclination is that the check-top-scores-first and award seats by quota and then do Allocated Score… that seems optimal. It brings in a bit of later-no-harm. It makes it safe to express preferences for non-first-choice candidates. Without this top-scores-checked-first step, any block large enough to get a seat can force their favorite by bullet-voting.
The whole point of STAR vs plain score is to give the majority their wish no matter what. STAR brings a weak sort of later-no-harm which disrupts the pressure for majority to bullet-vote in plain score. Effectively, "don't worry about bullet-voting to force your favorite, we'll give it to you no matter what if you have a true majority, so you can express preferences and not worry about strategizing". And while STAR is not strictly Condorcet, it's effective enough to achieve this reduction of bullet-vote pressure.
STAR-PR needs to keep this core point. We don't want voting blocks to feel regret that they could have forced a preferred outcome by bullet-voting. Simply giving seats to any blocks with enough 5-star votes seems the answer to me.
I don't think this is inherently obviously good, just as I don't think majority-winners in single-seat elections are necessarily good (compared to consensus candidates with wider support). However, I support STAR in its majoritarian emphasis because that encourages honest preference expression. STAR-PR needs to follow the same pattern, to achieve the same overall effect.
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In the context of political parties, where a voter can only affiliate with one party and vote for one party, it's fairly easy to define proportional as you say, @wolftune, that "if there's a clear block of voters enough to have a quota of a seat, that block gets to elect whoever they prefer."
This is a simple and transparent result, which has value, but it's not necessarily the best result, because we know that voters are not factional hardliners that agree with their parties only and disagree with everyone else 100% all the time.
For a better example we can take 6 parties with candidates; Red, Orange, Yellow, Green, Blue, Purple. Blue voters would give Blue 5 stars, but also like cool colors in general. Orange voters love Orange but also like warm colors like Yellow and Red. Red voters also like Orange but also like Purple. These parties supporters also tend to like Brown, though it's not a color on the color wheel and thus not a real party in Colorland. Lets also say that Red and Purple voters actually slightly prefer Ultraviolet and Infrared, though those colors make no sense to most voters.
In a quota rule PR election where there are 6 winners is it fair if Brown, who is liked by all and highest scoring overall never wins? When parties overlap and Venn Diagram, who is to say which is the "real" faction? Is a winner set the most representative if Ultraviolet and Infrared win, even though they were disliked by every other faction, while Red and Purple were also loved by their supporters but were also well liked by their peers?
My point is that real voters have nuanced preferences, so an expressive 5 star PR method can and should take the strength of those preferences into account. (Allocated Score does this in determining which voters get allocated to a given winner. Adding runoffs to the winner selection, or doing Monroe Selection would do this even more, with some added complexity.)
As said above, the definition of PR that we use for List PR or STV, if applied to a score ballot, would say that if a quota bullet votes then they will win a seat. That works for ordinal methods, but it specifically selects for polarizing winner sets and could care less about electing candidates who represent more voters when possible. This also might allocate voters and consider them represented by a candidate who they ranked 5th and dislike, or who they only voted for as a lesser evil.
We could also aim for a stricter proportionality criteria that does recognize and reward consensus candidates, particularly if they are alternatives that are representative for factions that slightly prefer a highly polarizing or antagonistic option.
A reasonable definition of high spectrum PR might be that "if there's a clear block of voters enough to have a quota of a seat, that block gets to elect the most widely supported of the candidates they like." Another way to think about that is that "that block gets to elect the least polarizing of the candidates they like." (Q: what score is a candidate who is "liked" by a voter? 4? 3?)
This guarantees the most representative proportional winner set possible and likely would find the most effective but still diverse winner set. It doesn't guarantee that everyone gets their favorite. It does get each faction an advocate who is likely to be more effective with the larger elected body, however.
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@sarawolk I think 100% of your arguments apply to plain score voting as being preferred to STAR. If everyone is honest, plain score is better than STAR for all the reasons you express. I agree with the values and the balance you describe. However, I think all the justifications for STAR over plain score also apply to adding the first step of block-allocation based on 5-star counts over plain Allocated Score.
Do you see my point about how the runoff in STAR is a balancing factor and discouragement of strategizing in the same way as the adjustment to STAR-PR that came up here?
We don't need to discuss whether brown should win, because the argument that brown should win is also an argument for brown getting elected in single-seat elections even when the majority has a more polarizing favorite. So, again, if you accept the reasons for STAR over plain score, then all the same reasons need to be dealt with in determining the best STAR-PR instead of going with a score-PR that doesn't address what STAR was invented to address.
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@wolftune
I noticed something similar with reweighted range voting when I tested it years ago. I had simulations with a "gray party" that got the same medium score from every voter, alongside colored parties that got the maximum score from their party voters and the minimum score from everybody else. I noticed that as I varied the score for the gray party, it would suddenly "explode" from having no seats to having all the seats.I devised a fix, which I later learned was the Kotze-Pereira Transform.
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@isocratia Yes, as I mentioned above, the KP-transformation "protects" the high scoring part of someone's vote from being deweighted when a candidate they gave a lower score to gets elected. Also it simplifies the process in that you just have to use an approval-based PR method rather than having to work out what to do with the scores.
Also, rather than electing sequentially starting with the highest scoring candidate, you can potentially avoid the favourite-of-nobody candidates from getting elected by using other algorithms (like e.g. MaxSwapPAV, mentioned in this thread) that get closer to the "optimum" set without necessarily having to try out every combination of candidates.
One problem with the methods that elect a candidate and then remove a quota of votes is that they often don't actually have a way of measuring a set of candidates. They use a process rather than a measure and therefore can't decide which set of candidates is better when given two in isolation.
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I don't like the idea of getting rid of "favorite of nobody" as an end in itself. The goal I'm describing is to elect the clear favorite of a quota-sized block. There's no goal of stopping the election of consensus non-favorite candidates, and I would oppose making design choices based on that goal.
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@wolftune Sure, but I was referring specifically to the favourite-of-nobody candidates in this scenario and the fact that they could all get elected.
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@toby-pereira that doesn't change my point. Blocking someone's election just because they are nobody's favorite is not a goal I support at all. Being the top favorite of anyone is not the point in itself. A candidate that is nobody's favorite and that everyone really still highly approves of is likely a good candidate to elect as long as any quota-sized blocks of voters get their favorites.
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@wolftune OK, that's fine. I don't disagree with your point. But I was clarifying in case your post was a response to my bit about the candidates that are the favourites of nobody, but obviously it wasn't.
But just to be clear anyway - when I was talking about not wanting to elect the favourite-of-nobody candidates, I wasn't referring to stopping the election of such candidates in principle. But we've discussed certain specific scenarios where we all seem to agree that electing the candidates that are the favourite of nobody isn't the best thing to do. And I was discussing ways to elect the candidates we would want to in this situation.
