Condorcet // Score
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Collect Score-style ballots on the range {100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}.
Every precinct should publish the sum of the scores for each candidate and the summed preference matrix reflecting the votes in that precinct. It doesn't matter whether the lower triangle of the matrix is used. If it is, the effective preference between candidates i and j is M[i, j] - M[j, i].
If there is a Condorcet winner, elect her or him.
Otherwise, elect the Score winner.
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@jack-waugh I'm not sure I'm convinced by those specific scores being allowed but not others. Also, there is also Smith//Score, which I would consider to be superior. It elects the score winner of the Smith set. Under Condorcet//Score, the winner could be a candidate outside the top cycle.
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@toby-pereira said in Condorcet // Score:
Under Condorcet//Score, the winner could be a candidate outside the top cycle.
But she would be the Score winner, so not a bad outcome.
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Condorcet // Score is monotonic, right? If you top-rate your favorite candidate, that can neither hurt her in the Condorcet part nor in the Score part.
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@jack-waugh I think that’s right.
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@jack-waugh said in Condorcet // Score:
@toby-pereira said in Condorcet // Score:
Under Condorcet//Score, the winner could be a candidate outside the top cycle.
But she would be the Score winner, so not a bad outcome.
Not necessarily a bad outcome in its own right, but it makes the method more discontinuous than it needs to be. A candidate who isn't in the running can suddenly win because those that are in the running get too close to each other.