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    Approval vs. IRV

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    • J
      Jack Waugh last edited by

      There will be a debate on this topic on 2021-03-26 at 15:30 Eastern.

      Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].

      K Marylander J 4 Replies Last reply Reply Quote 0
      • K
        Keith Edmonds @Jack Waugh last edited by

        @Jack-Waugh STAR should be invited

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        • Marylander
          Marylander @Jack Waugh last edited by Marylander

          @Jack-Waugh It's nice to see a cardinal method being invited to the table, and not just IRV.

          Score Sorted Margins[100]; STAR[90]; Score[81]; Approval[59]; IRV[18]; FPTP[0]

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          • E
            Essenzia last edited by

            IRV uses ranking which is inconvenient as a voting method.
            Ranking requires (for "voter equality") that all voters evaluate the same number of candidates and therefore there will always be some voters who wanted to rank more candidates, and other voters who wanted to rank less.
            Writing it on paper is more difficult than AV.

            AV, on the other hand, is exaggeratedly simple to understand and write, with no restrictions on the minimum or maximum number of candidates to be evaluated.

            On a theoretical level, IRV doesn't seem to me to have good enough sides to beat AV.

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            • J
              Jack Waugh @Jack Waugh last edited by

              Regarding the debate that Yale sponsored:

              At the end, someone announced that there would be a place for discussions following up, some organ of Yale's, but I didn't record the name of that organ.

              Mr. Drutman opined that no single-winner election can defend against two-party dominance. I would like to ask him, in that case, why he debated on the side of one voting system over another for such elections.

              Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].

              J Marylander 2 Replies Last reply Reply Quote 0
              • J
                Jack Waugh last edited by

                To those who want to abbreviate Approval Voting as AV, let me point out that in the UK, AV means IRV (as the "Alternative Vote").

                Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].

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                • J
                  Jack Waugh @Jack Waugh last edited by

                  @Jack-Waugh Eventually it occurred to me that Drutman might be present on the Twitter service. And indeed, there he is. So I wrote in public to him via that service, "@leedrutman, given your position that no single-winner election procedure could make it possible for third-party and independent candidates to beat the Republicans and 'Democrats', why did you take a side for one single-winner voting system vs. another? What good can come from reforming single-winner elections or indeed from voting in them if the outcome is predetermined?"

                  Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].

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                  • J
                    Jack Waugh @Jack Waugh last edited by

                    @Jack-Waugh The recording of the debate is now published by Yale.

                    Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].

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                    • Marylander
                      Marylander @Jack Waugh last edited by Marylander

                      @Jack-Waugh said in Approval vs. IRV:

                      Mr. Drutman opined that no single-winner election can defend against two-party dominance. I would like to ask him, in that case, why he debated on the side of one voting system over another for such elections.

                      This seems to be the central issue. If you assume that single-winner election systems will inevitably be two-party dominated, then IRV does basically everything you could want. It will strike out everyone but the top two, then pick the most preferred candidate between the two. In a two party dominated Approval contest, the voters must decide for themselves how much they value influencing the contest between the frontrunners, and how much they value making other distinctions. You'll notice that in two-party dominated elections that use plurality, voters similarly have to make choices about which distinctions they most value making. I think this is why they often compare Approval to plurality and emphasize later no harm - the kinds of elections that IRV advocates worry about look very specifically like Gore losing to Bush in Florida.

                      When I talk to local IRV advocates, the most persuasive thing I can do is to point out that local races don't look like Bush vs Gore, because when there is a competitive race, it is often because there is an open seat, and 3 or 4 people who have been waiting to run for that seat all see their opportunity.

                      Score Sorted Margins[100]; STAR[90]; Score[81]; Approval[59]; IRV[18]; FPTP[0]

                      J 1 Reply Last reply Reply Quote 0
                      • J
                        Jack Waugh @Marylander last edited by

                        @Marylander said in Approval vs. IRV:

                        [IRV] will strike out everyone but the top two, then pick the most preferred candidate between the two.

                        The current system does that just fine.

                        Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].

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