Topics created by Casimir

@casimir said in BTR-score:

That's good. You may even remove the "Hiveism substack" in the text and just keep the foot note if this makes it more readable.

Since every voter can vote for only one candidate, votes are a limited resource that candidates compete over. This turns campaigning into a zero-sum game. Candidates with similar political values must compete against each other. They split the votes, which benefits their mutual opponent.

Thank you, your quote helped the article, a plurality votes as a limited resource does explain some of the current rancor.

People diss voting systems that have not yet been used in public elections, even though the two systems with the most current use, plurality and IRV, have been found wanting.

@casimir Ah. Then if that holds up in court, I think the power relations would not be damaged by putting more candidates in the final. The subset of voters who are unwilling to research obscure candidates would benefit from receiving a major hint about what other voters have judged. Candidates receiving majority approval in the primary would seem worth their attending to.

@casimir I did not know what system Germany used and thanks for stating it.

I think that your proposals are best for meeting the stated objectives.

If some people really want to try ranking, they could use Ranked Robin. This would give an overall ranking in terms of how many other candidates a given candidate beats. Ties in that ranking could be broken based on how many voters preferred the given candidate minus how many preferred others who tied with that candidate in the first measure.

I've thought of a slightly-simpler variant on MARS: Each candidate's score is equal to their range score, plus the score of the strongest (highest-scored) candidate they majority-beat. Thinking through what properties this would have.

@lime

I do not understand this part:

Use quadratic voting to pick the best remaining candidate. (Rebrand it as equal-weight voting, by framing it as taking each ballot and dividing by its "weight"—i.e. sum of squares.)

@Casimir said in ICA/ICT/SICT - So what about "improved Condorcet" methods?:

Why would that be preferred? And does this only work when explicitly ranking/approving both, or also for bottom ranks? In that case one could state the rule as just: "A candidate is unbeaten if there is no other candidate that is ranked higher by more than half of all voters." Which also would be easier to calculate and visualize.

If ties count in favor of both candidates when they are compared, then at the bottom ranks, voters would want to make up a ranking for those candidates just because it would hurt whoever is put lower in the ranking.

Generally, this system reminds me of a system I thought about a while ago but I don't know if I wrote about it anywhere. (The thinking behind them is basically the same.) It works like Minimax Condorcet with co-equal ranks, but there is an approval-like cutoff in the ranking. For tied candidates above a ballot's cutoff, the ballot counts for both candidates in that pairwise matchup. For tied candidates below a ballot's cutoff, the ballot counts against both candidates in that pairwise matchup.

Ultimately the thing that I really don't like about that system is that the notion of a coequal ranking is deceptive: coequal rankings sound like they are intended to indicate that you support both candidates equally, but the system is designed so that they really serve a strategic purpose.