The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform
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@toby-pereira It's important to have explicit instructions.
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@toby-pereira said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
STAR only fixes it for the final round, so the problem still exists when determining which candidates make the final.
As long as the instructions are clear and explicit there's an argument that this is a feature, not a bug. Some people actually don't have strong preferences and don't love or hate any of the options, even relative to each other. This comes up in polls more than in elections, but we do see voters argue that the nuance between candidates is only one kind of useful nuance. They also like being able to show the difference between a strong preference and a weak one or an abstention.
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@toby-pereira I really like Condorcet methods as well, 5 stars. Condorcet cardinal methods are best in class too, but I don't like that it's a bit misleading for voters. It looks like the level of support you give will matter, not just the preference order, but in fact the scores are almost never used in practice (unless there's a Condorcet cycle).
STAR has a more even balance between Condorcet and Cardinal and I like that. I think both approaches have strong benefits. In plant breeding and natural selection there's a concept called hybrid vigor. I think STAR has that.
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@sarawolk As for why two. Two candidates is the number that guarantees a majority preferred winner whenever possible, and two is the number that eliminates spoilers. Top two runoffs have huge advantages, both mathematically and in terms of perception, and so STAR leverages that.
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@sarawolk said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
@lime Our experience has been that Score and Approval are non-starters for many of the most influential groups, like League of Women Voters, because of issues or perceived issues and incentives for strategic voting.
That might be the case, but I'm guessing there's a very big difference between what LWV thinks and what the average person thinks.
@sarawolk said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
Worse, in Score Voting if a voter fails to use the full range of the ballot then their vote is less powerful than a voter who did. Since a rating is commonly used with the top score being a perfect/love rating, it's an expected behavior that some voters, especially people new to the system, will give their favorites lower scores because almost no politicians are actually loveable.
I'm not actually convinced that's a problem. If someone wants to cast an honest ballot that says they're unsure, or that they think all the candidates are equally bad, that should be up to them. This is an honest vote expressing how strongly they care. Some people will be upset or happy with the result, no matter who wins.
There's two possibilities here: either the voter wanted to cast an honest (unnormalized) ballot, or they wanted to cast a dishonest ballot but didn't know how.
If they want to be honest, that's fine, and that's their right. We shouldn't stop them.
If they don't, that seems like two strikes against them: they're not honest, and they're not smart enough to strategize. Why give their ballot a higher weight?
I'm generally opposed to "automatic strategy" in cases where voters have chosen not to use it. Some kinds of automatic strategy can be good, if they make use of information that's not available to the average person. Otherwise, why are we using score or STAR instead of approval?
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@lime But what is honest in this context? On a 0 to 5 scale, how much do you have to like your favourite candidate to "honestly" give them 5 stars?
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@toby-pereira said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
@lime But what is honest in this context? On a 0 to 5 scale, how much do you have to like your favourite candidate to "honestly" give them 5 stars?
What's perfect honesty? I don't know. Interpersonal utility comparisons are hard.
But I can still do better than assuming everyone has equally-strong preferences; sometimes I just don't care that much about an election.
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@sarawolk Yes, & so the obvious solution is to propose the absolute MINIMAL multicandidate voting-system. The simplest one:
Approval.
If you want something more elaborate, then you can always ask for it later. But, for now, first, get voting-system reform at all, by proposing & enacting the absolute minimal Approval.
It's the least to ask for. ...&, as you know, it's minimalness makes it the completely un-arbitrary method, & the most easily described, ,defined, proposed, enacted, implemented, administered, & audited for error & count-fraud.
Sure, the infinitely-many elaborations, such as rank- balloting methods, can be a convenience-luxury for voters. Rank-balloting, for example is an automatic-machine that takes your preferences as input, & outputs a result for you.
Whereas Approval is a handtool that requires something from the voter, a rank-method does it all for you. But the cost of that is the loss of all of the abovementioned Approval-advantages. I suggest that the problem of whether the voter will use Approval optimally is nothing compared to the problem of failure to enact the method, or being able to afford its implementation, or prevent count-fraud.
I should add that, though it's often pointed out that Approval's implementation requires only the deletion of the software code that prevents "overvotes"...event that isn't needed:
Say it's an Approval election between 5 candidates. Tell the count program that it's five 2-candidate races. The ballot-card only has a candidate name & a pencil-bubble or punch-place on every other line...the line for each actual candidate, On the fictitious candidate's line, the ballot card just has blank-space.
One each ballot, the count-software records your vote for the actual-candidate, & zero vote for the fictitious one. When the count is concluded, the software reports the vote-totals for all the actual candidates, & zero votes for each of the fictitious candidate.
Thereby is Approval implement4d without any software modifications. ...at absolutely zero cost.
So, forget all the elaborations that we might like, & just propose the method that's completely un-arbitrary because it's absolutely minimal: Approval.
Do you want reform, or do you want to diddle-debate forever about which elaboration is better?
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Our experience has been that Score and Approval are non-starters for many of the most influential groups, like League of Women Voters, because of issues or perceived issues and incentives for strategic voting.
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When they express those issues, remind them that Approval, & not Vote-For-1, allows rating of each candidate, & thereby the expression & counting of support for as many as one wants.
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Remind them that when you ask for too much, you often don’t get anything. Remind them that we don’t have time to debate forever about the best elaboration.
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Approval is another great system, but the fact is that voters need to approve the front-runner on their side (and everyone they like better than them). That means that a voter who doesn't like the frontrunners has to lie and approve one anyways to have an effective voice.
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No, you don’t have to approve anyone that don’t like. Never approve someone that you don’t like.
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…& if you believe that the frontrunners are both people you don’t like, then you’ve probably been very deceived by the mass-media. Don’t believe everything that you hear in the mass-media.
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The Democrat & the Republican aren’t “the two choices”.
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Alternative voting advocates in my experience (especially 3rd party voters) want to be able to show that they prefer their favorite over the frontrunner on their side.
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Condorcet (as RP(wv) ) would be the way to achieve that, but the complicated contraptions that can achieve that have too many problems, lacking Approval’s easy description, definition, proposing, enactment, implementation, administration, & auditing against error & count-fraud.
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STAR? It’s in-between the extremes of Approval & the rank-methods…a compromise between them. Most importantly, it doesn’t have Approval’s absolute minimalness & resulting unique un-arbitrariness of choice. Its score-count & runoff require added software, where Approval doesn’t require any new software, or even any modification of current count-software (as described later in this post)
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As I was saying before, yes STAR has some voters-helping features that Approval doesn’t have. But I claim that it’s better to trust to voters to do well with Approval than to take on the disadvantages of the more complicated methods, including any in-between compromise.
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I want STAR to succeed in Eugene, & I’d vote for STAR’s enactment in an already-existing initiative or referendum if it’s too late to start an initiative or referendum for Approval.
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But I suggest that all electoral-reformers, including CES & Equal-Vote, should, right now, be contacting the Oregon State Legislature & proposing that, in November, it shouldn’t just be an “RCV” referendum. It should instead be competing referenda for both “RCV” & Approval.
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…or maybe they should just drop the “RCV” referendum due to its fraudulent promotion,
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But, not only as a competing parallel referendum: If “RCV” is being voted-on for all Oregon elections other than the Legislature, then why shouldn’t Approval be voted for in a referendum for enactment for voting for state Legislators? (…or at least one house of the Legislature).
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So, two possibilities: 1) Competing parallel referenda (but maybe just drop “RCV”); & 2) A referendum for Approval for election of state Legislators.
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Ideally, RP(wv) & the Finnish system of open-list proportional-representation should be offered too, just in case people might prefer rank-voting or PR…but it’s probably a bit late in the year to propose something that isn’t minimal, as Approval is.
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(…but it should be noted that Finnish open-list PR wouldn’t require any new balloting-equipment or count-software modifications. When the vote-count has been reported, the seat allocations to the parties & to their candidates could be determined at any kitchen-table where there’s a hand-calculator.)
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BTW: The Greens aren’t 3rd-Party. If everyone who would prefer the things that they offer that polls say most people want, knew what is offered & voted honestly, the Greens would be 1st-party. …& one of the 2 frontrunners.
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As Robert Bristow-Johnson points-out, yes Approval voting can be tactical. So what. You don’t know whether you should approve your 2nd-choice? Neither do the other voters, so don’t worry about it.
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Which feels more important?: The danger that your favorite will lose to your 2nd choice, or the danger that your 2nd choice will lose to worse candidates? You could just vote according to which danger feels worse.
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Yes Approval is a different kind of voting, compared to rank-balloting. Tactical, sure, when you aren’t using a rank-method to do it all for you. There are many ways of voting, & many ways of making the choice. But that’s a good thing for the voter, because s/he can do it any way s/he likes, any way s/he feels like.
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How complicated the choice is, is up to you. Often we might have the goal of maximizing our expectation. Expectation & probability are subjective. A shuffled & cut deck of cards is on the table. I take the top-card & look at it, not showing it to you, & put it in my pocket, & ask you what is the probability that the top-card is now the ace-of-spades. To you, that probability is 1/52. To me, it’s either zero or 1/51. Neither of us is wrong.
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Expectation depends on what information you have & choose to use.
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Situations differ in what kind of information we have. Maybe the frontrunners are the most reliable information.
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Best-Frontrunner is a valid expectation-maximizing strategy in Approval. But don’t take the mass-media’s word for who the frontrunners are. The Democrat & Republican aren’t really “the two choices”. If you use Best-Frontrunner don’t be a sucker about who the frontrunners are.
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If you don’t know or feel who the frontrunners are, then that strategy isn’t for you. There are other methods. They’re versions of voting honestly.
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There’s the Better-Than-Expectation strategy: Vote for all the candidates who are better than what you expect from the election. Which candidates would you rather install instead of holding an election? Which candidate is so good that hir election would pleasantly surprise you? Approve hir & all that are better.
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When you approve above your perceived expectation (& others do too), you raise your expectation.
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Never approve below your perceived expectation. That would lower your expectation.
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Or maybe your best information is about who’s the likely CW.
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One way to judge expectation-maximization is the reasonable assumption that the CW is the best that each voter can get, & therefore hir best choice for bottom-approval: Approve down to the CW.
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So, if you have a good estimate of roughly where the CW is, in the candidate-lineup, that can be a good way of voting: Approve the likely CW & everyone better.
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In the Internet polls I’ve seen, the Green is usually the CW. Sometimes Bernie, but usually the Green.
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Yes that’s right: No need to vote for anyone who isn’t as good as the Green. …in Approval or Plurality. The media have deceived you about what the other voters want. They want a lot better than what the Republocrats allow. Universal medical care, higher taxes on the rich, more equality, not always being in wars. Polls & surveys indicate that the public are incomparably more progressive than their Republocrat “representatives”.
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Also, notice that in Burlington & Alaska, when the CW was eliminated, the transfers & the win went in the progressive direction. …because the median voters chose someone more, instead of less, progressive. …further confirming that the voter-median is progressive, & that the CW is among the progressive candidates.
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Don’t let anyone tell you that the Democrat & the Republican are “the two choices”.
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Another way of identifying the CW is: Who’s the best candidate such that the people preferring hir to the worse ones amount to a majority? Maybe that’s the strongest or perceived-most-reliable information that you have.
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Or: Approval is Set-Voting: Ask yourself if there’s a set that you like better than the rest, & approve them.
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Or just approve the ones that you like. That maximizes the likelihood of electing someone you like. What’s wrong with that?
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Or, if you feel like it, vote for the ones you feel to be above the candidates’ average merit. Or, if you don’t have that good an estimate of merits, then the most likely guess for who’s above-average is that the best half of the candidates are most likely the above-average ones.
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Or sometimes there’s a particularly large merit-gap somewhere among the candidates. Among these possibilities, that’s probably the most likely merit-fact that we perceive among the candidate-merits. So approve the candidates above that largest gap.
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That’s justified by the fact that, though Approval doesn’t allow you to vote all of your preferences, it allows you to vote the ones that you consider the most important. That largest merit-gap is a good measure of that.
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…& it’s supported by the Set-Voting mentioned above.
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But all of those strategies are moot for me, because I claim that our elections are merit-dichotomous: Two-valued merit. There are completely unacceptable candidates.
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So, for me, Approval voting is really simple, & is the perfect fit to how I judge the candidates:
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Just approve all the acceptables & none of the unacceptable.
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But, if you don’t perceive it that way, you could just approve the ones that you feel like approving. If there’s no other information, then that maximizes your expectation based on what you know or feel.
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It could be argued that there’s an objective optimal way of voting: The one that would give the highest total utility if used in a long sequence of elections. …if you knew what it is. If you want to pursue that, then you use the maximum amount of available information, the most detailed information, to calculate which vote would maximize that objective expectation.
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For one thing that would require a lot of really unreliable probability-guesses, & difficultly-quantified numerical utility-estimates for the candidates. The great unreliability of that input-information is obvious, & it surely isn’t worth the great amount of work in calculating an optimal vote based on it. So forget that kind of strategy. Forget about “objective optimal vote”.
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The voter needn’t have all these possibilities explained to hir. S/he’ll already like & use one of them. This multiplicity of ways of voting isn’t a complication. The beauty of Approval voting is that one can use any of those ways of choosing (& maybe various others too). Whichever one feels the best, is the best for you. It maximizes your expectation based on what you know or feel.
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Lastly, it should be pointed out that Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the voter-median. Approval will soon home in on the CW, at the voter-median. People who criticize Approval because they want it all done for them by a rank-method forget about that Myerson-Weber equilibrium.
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A Myerson-Weber equilibrium is an outcome that confirms the voters assumptions that led voters to vote as they did.
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Our “Plurality” Vote-For-1 system can keep on electing ANY pair of candidates, however disliked, forever at Myerson-Weber equilibrium.
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…which of course is what it’s been doing, & will continue to do unless & until we replace it with Approval.
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As I said, Approval is a completely different kind of voting, compared to rankings. Approval is a handtool that leaves it to you. …& thereby it’s the absolute minimal method, & therefore it’s the unique completely un-arbitrary method-choice.
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But what if, despite these considerations, progressives are hopelessly enamored of & wedded to rankings, due to the heavily-funded “RCV” (Hare) promotion? Then:
…- Offer them a better rank-method. Yes, IRVists point out that there’s much to be said for not electing a middle CW compromise who is unliked. Yes, when there’s a Mutual-Majority, Hare is guaranteed to choose the favorite candidate of the largest faction of a Mutual-Majority. But the IRVists are forgetting something when they use an argument about an unfavorite compromise:
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They’re forgetting that Hare is strategy-ridden & sucker-vulnerable. To avoid strategy-problems, it’s necessary to elect the CW, even if s/he might be unfavorite.
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So then, if progressives demand rankings, then offer them Condorcet, in its best version. Its best version is Ranked-Pairs(wv).
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Among the people who discuss voting-systems & compare rank-methods, Schulze & Ranked-Pairs (RP) are the popular methods. …& are regarded as the kings of criteria compliance.
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…&, additionally, RP(wv) is very strongly probabilistically autodeterrent for burial strategy, & invulnerable to offensive-truncation strategy.
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So, not only does RP(wv) meet the Minimal-Defense Criterion (Just don’t rank anyone you don’t like, & if the CW’s voters all refuse to do so, then no one they don’t like can take the win from the CW via burial). …& also, RP(wv) is invulnerable to offensive-truncation strategy.
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But, additionally, even if no one uses any defensive-strategy against burial, RP(wv) automatically probabilistically deters burial. I call that “autodeterrence”. RP(wv) is very strongly autodeterrent.
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If there’s a circular-tie in Condorcet, it will almost surely be a strategic one. That’s the only thing that can prevent Condorcet from electing the CW, & thereby delivering on the promise of counting & acting-on every preference voted by every voter.
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RP(wv), by thoroughly deterring burial, & thwarting offensive-truncation is the most strategy-free Condorcet. Yes, MinMax(wv) & Smith//MinMax(wv) share RP(wv)’s strategy-deterrence, but RP (along with the more complicated Schulze) is one of the two most favorite & prestigious methods among the people most familiar with voting-systems.
RP(wv) definition:
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If there’s no voted CW, due to a top-cycle, then:
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Drop the weakest defeat in each cycle.
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Elect the resulting undefeated candidate
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(The strength of a defeat is measured by how many ballots rank the defeater over the defeated.)
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2. But, if progressives really insist on “RCV”, then the task becomes the job of educating voters in Hare to not be lesser-evil favorite-burial giveaway suckers. Good luck.
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The progress of “RCV” enactment around the country, in many cities & 2 states, could mean that we just have to accept it as the way voting-system reform is going to happen,
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On the other hand, 2 states isn’t diddly-squat !!! In 35 years of heavily-funded pushing & promotion, FairVote only has 2 states to show for it??? What kind of progress is that?
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That’s why Approval seems the best prospect, in spite of “RCV” ‘s alleged success. Approval is good enough, & easy enough to define, describe, propose, enact, inexpensively implement, administer, oversee & audit against error & count-fraud… to take off a lot faster, everywhere, than “RCV” has. That’s why it’s Approval that I propose. - Offer them a better rank-method. Yes, IRVists point out that there’s much to be said for not electing a middle CW compromise who is unliked. Yes, when there’s a Mutual-Majority, Hare is guaranteed to choose the favorite candidate of the largest faction of a Mutual-Majority. But the IRVists are forgetting something when they use an argument about an unfavorite compromise:
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@sarawolk said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
@lime Among people who know about them or know about voting methods already, or among people who have never heard of them and get a simple explanation and form an intuitive opinion?
It looks like there's been a bunch of research on the topic, and the consensus seems to be that people prefer slightly more categories—up to 10, with more than 10 having smaller effects. When given the option to rate candidates on a 100-point scale, voters almost-always choose multiples of 10 (with no peaks at multiples of 20); asked to explicitly state which of several scales they liked best, they usually go with 10-point scales; and in psychometrics, the validity of self-ratings usually increases up to 9-11 categories.
https://www.rangevoting.org/RateScaleResearch.htmlOn the other hand, having to fit ten stars on a ballot would be a pain, so I think a +0.5 option is a better presentation. But it looks like 5 is uncomfortably few for most people.
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Yes, & so the obvious solution is to propose the absolute MINIMAL multicandidate voting-system.
My point was NOT that we should only promote STAR or that we should eliminate Approval for consideration. I think they are both great options that are not redundant at all.
The point was that having TOO MANY options is harmful to the adoption of any of them. How many is too many? I would (jokes aside) argue for the elimination of all that are redundant and don't add to the conversation. One traditional ballot, one ranked, and one scored system is plenty. We can eliminate any that have serious issues with vote-splitting and accuracy, that have have serious issues with voided ballots, or voter error, that have problematic strategic incentives, or that have unnecessary complexity that doesn't add much to the question.
To me that leaves us with STAR, Approval, and Ranked Robin (aka Condorcet), and the multi-winner and PR versions of those.
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Approval is another great system, but the fact is that voters need to approve the front-runner on their side (and everyone they like better than them). That means that a voter who doesn't like the frontrunners has to lie and approve one anyways to have an effective voice.
No, you don’t have to approve anyone that don’t like. Never approve someone that you don’t like.
Okay. You don't HAVE to, but you should. If the options are Trump, Bernie, and Biden, I don't want to approve Biden and I also don't want to bullet vote Bernie. Approval in that election doesn't get the job done. I need to be able to show that I prefer my favorite, even if I think he's an underdog. I need to be able to give my lesser evil 1 star to prevent vote-splitting without strategically supporting a candidate I dislike.
This doesn't mean that I don't support Approval, I do approve it, but this does mean that I'm not inspired to support it to the exclusion of all others. It also means I worry it doesn't have what it takes to win over reformers in sufficient numbers with sufficient enthusiasm.
The pitch for Approval, to someone excited about any other alternative voting method, is that even though they think they want to be able to show their preferences, their preferences are actually irrelevant because Approval doesn't need them to find a good enough centrist consensus winner. That's not a compelling response and it comes across as tone deaf and dismissive. Approval has been proposed over and over in Oregon. The fact that it's not the proposal isn't for lack of being included in the options.
just propose the method that's completely un-arbitrary because it's absolutely minimal: Approval.
Where to put your Approval threshold is absolutely arbitrary unless I'm a sophisticated strategic voter who knows that I should approve the frontrunner on my side and everyone I like better than them. In any case the threshold moves dramatically from election to election and from race to race. That's not actually simple for voters.
remind them that...
Please join your local League of Women Voters chapters and remind them yourself. It's not for women only and they need more people who know the facts on voting reform. This was my point. Don't be an armchair election theorist. It's a battle out there and we need you all, even if we don't agree on top choice method.
You don’t know whether you should approve your 2nd-choice? Neither do the other voters, so don’t worry about it.
Great! Thanks. I'll take your word for it. It's just our elections.
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@sarawolk said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
To me that leaves us with STAR, Approval, and Ranked Robin (aka Condorcet), and the multi-winner and PR versions of those.
I'm not sure that these are necessarily the only options. I've said before that I don't agree that Ranked Robin is the best Condorcet method. I think Equal Vote chose it because of its simplicity. However, its simplicity as a base method simply shifts any complexity into the tie-break.
Electing the candidate with the most head-to-head wins when there is not a Condorcet winner will likely more often than not do nothing. There will probably be a three-way cycle, so three candidates on the same head-to-head wins. So it just moves to the next tie-break, which I believe is a Borda count among the remaining winners. So at this point of complexity, especially when you also consider that it's not cloneproof, I don't see it really has any advantages over Ranked Pairs, which is cloneproof.
Also for a score-based method, I'm still not convinced that STAR is the method. I said on the Election Methods list the other day that while basically all methods fail Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), STAR seems to do so in a more wilful way. I'll just quote myself:
However, with STAR, say candidate A scores highest followed by B. B then beats A head-to-head and wins the election. But let's say that C enters the race and all the other candidates' scores remain the same. C's total score is between A and B. A then beats C in the head-to-head and wins the election. Also we can imagine that B beats both A and C head-to-head and is the Condorcet winner. In this case, STAR has decided that B need not be compared to A head-to-head because another candidate has an intermediate score. But nothing has materially changed between A and B. This is a failure of IIA caused by a decision to make it happen.
Also I've never been comfortable with STAR failing independence of clones, as I see it as a fairly "cheap" criterion to pass. From the same post:
Also on STAR's clone failure - I think Chris Benham previously talked about having an approval cut-off and having the run-off between the most approved candidate and the candidate approved on most ballots that don't approve the most approved candidate (he called it approval opposition). You could also do something similar with the scores. The run-off would be between the highest scoring candidate and the candidate with the greatest "score excess" over that candidate. To measure candidate A's score excess over candidates B, you add up the differences in score between A and B on all the ballots where A outscores B. This is arguably a simple enough change to STAR to make it cloneproof.
I do understand resistance to any changes that would make STAR more complex though obviously.
Finally about what you said about approval - I like approval partly because of its simplicity and the lack of any advantages FPTP has over it (simplicity and participation are FPTP's only "weapons" as far as I can see). But I do also agree it has problems when it comes to people not wanting to endorse a particular candidate. As I posted here:
Arguably one problem with approval voting is that people might refuse to approve the "lesser evil" of the two main candidates because they see it as a vote for and an endorsement of them. Whereas with a ranked ballot, they simply rank the candidates in order and the notion of endorsement need not come into it. Under FPTP, people will often say they could not vote for x, even if it's between x and y, and they prefer x to y. This is likely to carry over into approval voting.
Edit - and to finish, I'll requote your previous comment:
To me that leaves us with STAR, Approval, and Ranked Robin (aka Condorcet), and the multi-winner and PR versions of those.
There was a thread recently pointing out that proportional STAR isn't really STAR. Also, having reflected on the Allocated Score method that was selected by the committee, I no longer consider it to be the best option. I was involved in some of the discussions as you know and agreed to it at the time, but I've considered the matter further and I think there are much better options. I remember at the time that it wasn't to be set in stone for eternity, but I'm not sure what the criteria for review are either.
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@toby-pereira said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
Also for a score-based method, I'm still not convinced that STAR is the method. I said on the Election Methods list the other day that while basically all methods fail Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), STAR seems to do so in a more wilful way. I'll just quote myself:
That's kind of interesting, because I took you as saying the opposite (which is also my understanding of STAR): that STAR doesn't have to fail IIA (or clone-independence), but intentionally chooses to do so because this leads to a slightly better outcome. With STAR, the optimal strategy is for every party to run 2 candidates, which gives every voter at least two choices they can feel comfortable with.
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where both Biden and Kamala Harris were listed separately on the ballot so I could rank Harris higher (and help her win the runoff). Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race; on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I disapprove of him for reasons of competence. (But I'm sure as hell not supportive of any other candidate...) With STAR, every voter should have at least two choices they consider tolerable.
Personally, I think of STAR as just reversing the primary-then-general order: we have a general election to choose the best party (the score round), and then a "primary" where we pick the best nominee by majority vote.
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@toby-pereira said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
I was involved in some of the discussions as you know and agreed to it at the time, but I've considered the matter further and I think there are much better options. I remember at the time that it wasn't to be set in stone for eternity, but I'm not sure what the criteria for review are either.
I'll always support any kind of highest-averages system over quota-allocation. (Although as mentioned in another thread, they don't conflict if we drop the fixed-size assumption; Congress used this trick to apportion seats from 1850–1910.)
Any system that violates participation without being forced at gunpoint (by a four-way Condorcet cycle) is probably unconstitutional, since it strips some people of their voting rights (making their ballots less than worthless).
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@lime said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
the consensus seems to be that people prefer slightly more categories—up to 10, with more than 10 having smaller effects.
For voting having high-quality, more reliable data is really important so it's important to have the range on the lower end of the workable cognitive load range. 10 is too many. Ballot design for paper ballots also makes a field of too many bubbles a non-starter, like you say. Third, we have to remember that a voters available cognitive load should not all be all used up on the rating itself. The voter needs some bandwidth available to consider the actual candidates as well.
"Determining the number of scale points is a balancing act, which creates a tension when trying to maximize data quality. Including more scale points might differentiate responses more, whereas fewer scale points might produce more reliability. Fortunately, survey methodology research on this subject provides some guidelines for best practices that enable optimal validity and reliability. The results of this research suggest that the optimal number of scale points ranges from 5 to 9—with fewer points, you lose the ability to differentiate as much as you could between respondents, and with more scale points, the reliability of responses tends to drop off."
As we see in this thread, some people are saying that STAR is too much and that they prefer Approval for that reason. Others are saying that voters actually prefer 0-9 (citation needed). It makes a lot of sense to offer people something in the middle so we can maximize the best of both worlds.
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@lime said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
@toby-pereira said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
Also for a score-based method, I'm still not convinced that STAR is the method. I said on the Election Methods list the other day that while basically all methods fail Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), STAR seems to do so in a more wilful way. I'll just quote myself:
That's kind of interesting, because I took you as saying the opposite (which is also my understanding of STAR): that STAR doesn't have to fail IIA (or clone-independence), but intentionally chooses to do so because this leads to a slightly better outcome. With STAR, the optimal strategy is for every party to run 2 candidates, which gives every voter at least two choices they can feel comfortable with.
As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where both Biden and Kamala Harris were listed separately on the ballot so I could rank Harris higher (and help her win the runoff). Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race; on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I disapprove of him for reasons of competence. (But I'm sure as hell not supportive of any other candidate...) With STAR, every voter should have at least two choices they consider tolerable.
Personally, I think of STAR as just reversing the primary-then-general order: we have a general election to choose the best party (the score round), and then a "primary" where we pick the best nominee by majority vote.
I see, so you see this as a feature of STAR, not a bug? Obviously cloneproof methods mean that parties can run two candidates without them harming each other, but STAR actively encourages it, which you argue is a good thing. I hadn't actually thought about it that way, but I see your point. Essentially the run-off is just to decide within the party (reversing things as you say). I'm not sure it was the original intention of STAR, but it's worth discussing certainly.
On the other hand, people might get get annoyed if there is a candidate from another party who would have won head-to-head against the two in the run-off, but they just lost out in the scores, and therefore got cloned out of the run-off.
Also, with a better voting method (STAR or something else), elections shouldn't need to be party-dominated all the time. If there is an independent candidate (or candidate from a smaller party), they may not have someone to run alongside them, so they could be disadvantaged by this method (by not being able to block out the run-off if they are the most popular candidate).
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@lime said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
@toby-pereira said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
I was involved in some of the discussions as you know and agreed to it at the time, but I've considered the matter further and I think there are much better options. I remember at the time that it wasn't to be set in stone for eternity, but I'm not sure what the criteria for review are either.
I'll always support any kind of highest-averages system over quota-allocation. (Although as mentioned in another thread, they don't conflict if we drop the fixed-size assumption; Congress used this trick to apportion seats from 1850–1910.)
Any system that violates participation without being forced at gunpoint (by a four-way Condorcet cycle) is probably unconstitutional, since it strips some people of their voting rights (making their ballots less than worthless).
It's quite hard not to violate participation. If you use a highest averages party-list system then it's easy, but it becomes harder with candidate-based systems, especially where you elect sequentially rather than all-at-once for computational reasons. Non-deterministic methods might solve that, but would they be constitutional?
Different countries obviously have different constitutions, but I presume you're talking mainly about the US constitution.
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@sarawolk said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
@lime said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
the consensus seems to be that people prefer slightly more categories—up to 10, with more than 10 having smaller effects.
For voting having high-quality, more reliable data is really important so it's important to have the range on the lower end of the workable cognitive load range. 10 is too many. Ballot design for paper ballots also makes a field of too many bubbles a non-starter, like you say. Third, we have to remember that a voters available cognitive load should not all be all used up on the rating itself. The voter needs some bandwidth available to consider the actual candidates as well.
I'm not convinced that a voter has a set about of bandwidth that they have to share out between considering the candidates and the scores. Also if that paper says the optimum number of scores is 5 to 9, that presumably includes considering the thing and scoring it. And people will generally vote with some idea of what they are going to do. It's not the same as abstract surveys where the questions might be completely unknown to them. So I'd say bumping it up to 10 choices (so 0-9) is not completely unreasonable.
As we see in this thread, some people are saying that STAR is too much and that they prefer Approval for that reason. Others are saying that voters actually prefer 0-9 (citation needed). It makes a lot of sense to offer people something in the middle so we can maximize the best of both worlds.
I see the point, but approval has advantages for specifically being a binary thing rather than for just not having many choices. I don't think the graph of goodness has to necessarily go up and down smoothly with number of choices. E.g. I would prefer all of approval, 0-5 and 0-9 over 0-2, 0-3 or 0-4.
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@toby-pereira said in The dangers of analysis paralysis in voting reform:
Ranked Robin
We are planning to come back to the original intention around Ranked Robin, which is to stop branding Condorcet as a whole bunch of systems to fight between, and move to calling them one system, Ranked Robin, with a variety of "tie breaking protocols" a jurisdiction's special committee on niche election protocols could choose between. Honestly, specifying Copeland vs RP vs Minimax is way beyond the level of detail that should even be written into the election code or put to the voters.
Equal Vote's point with the Ranked Robin was never to say that Copeland is better than Ranked Pairs is better than Smith/Minimax. The point is that these are all equivalent in the vast, vast majority of scaled elections and that Condorcet as a whole is top shelf so it should be presented to voters as a better ranked ballot option. Ranked voting advocates should support it. The main reason Condorcet is not seriously considered is because of analysis paralysis and a total lack of interest in branding and marketing for simplicity and accessibility.
