Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise
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@k98kurz, @cfrank put it succinctly. "I think any advantage conferred to one candidate over any other in an election should be granted on an opt-in basis." Giving a candidate the middle score gives them an advantage over candidates who receive the lowest score, either from the voter in question or from other voters.
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@jack-waugh so then you are philosophically against the concept of a negative vote because you believe it gives an unfair advantage to someone that nobody opposes over someone who a majority of people oppose. The entire purpose of a negative vote is to disadvantage a candidate on an opt-in basis compared to the baseline -- if you make the baseline negative, you are removing that expressive ability entirely.
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"removing that expressive ability entirely." -- that's incorrect. I'm not removing any voter's expressive ability. Voters are free to use any of the three possible scores with any candidates they know about.
"someone that nobody opposes" -- I don't agree with that framing. Support and opposition are matters of degree. A candidate that nobody opposes would be one whose score as awarded by each voter is at least the average of the other scores awarded by that voter. Let's suppose that Mohandas, Martin, and Benito are on the ballot and Adolf is a write-in about whom I don't know. Say I give Mohandas and Martin the maximum score and Benito the minimum. Then under the negative vote, my ballot will be misinterpreted as giving Adolph the middle score. Under that interpretation, it is giving him partial opposition, because it lowers his score relative to the average of Mohandas, Martin, and Benito. So, for that whole election, Adolf is not a candidate whom no one opposed. My ballot gives him partial opposition. If I had known he was in the election and what he stood for, it would have given him full opposition.
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@jack-waugh I am not sure that I agree with the framing of opposition as simply anything less than the average support for candidates. Positive sentiment and negative sentiment are qualitatively different experiences -- given a set of 5 friends, I do not necessarily dislike the one who I like less than the others on average; given a set of 5 enemies, I do not necessarily like the one who I dislike less than the others on average.
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@k98kurz the qualitative experience of a voter has only little to do with the tactics they will employ to get what they want most. We also have to consider what can be easily implemented. While I don’t disagree with you about the suggestion that certain improvements could be made, I do believe (in agreement now with @SaraWolk) that this kind of argument is actually counterproductive to getting voting reform off the ground in the current phase. Adjustments can be made later. Right now we need to get something decent through to replace choose one voting, and that should be urgent priority #1. I strongly believe that the best way we can do that is by pushing with a concerted effort for basic, ordinary approval voting. My opinion is that we need to shift away from the “anything other than choose one” attitude and toward a specific replacement, and my estimation is that approval voting—while definitely not perfect—is the least contentiously agreed upon improvement.
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@cfrank approval voting would be the simplest, though it might be easier to convince judges who hold to the simplistic "one person, one vote" mantra that combined approval voting allows any one vote to exactly counteract another, not giving any one voter an unfair advantage.
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@k98kurz What you mean "combined"?
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@cfrank said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
my estimation is that approval voting—while definitely not perfect—is the least contentiously agreed upon improvement.
Why doesn't a granule size of 10% instead of 100% qualify as least-contentiously agreed-upon improvement? At least one informant tells me that Approval looks insufficiently expressive for assigning a score to a compromise candidate.
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I agree that Approval is a workable compromise and I think it should be the default voting method (as opposed to Choose One Plurality.)
On whether it should be the one reform we all work to implement, I don't agree. I don't think Approval is persuasive, and I don't think it's competitive against RCV, the status quo in voting reform. I wish it was.
I absolutely encourage advocates to continue to advocate, and I'll keep advocating for it, but I'm more persuaded now than ever that we need a reform that is scaleable, viable, and that delivers on the goals set out by RCV advocates while addressing it's serious pitfalls.
Approval voting tells inspired voting reformers to stop caring about the things they think they want, to change their priorities, and to trust the simulations over their intuition. That's not a winning pitch. The many benefits of Approval are neither transparent or self-evident to lay people and it appears to violate one person one vote, even though it should be the gold standard.
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@sarawolk said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
competitive against RCV
In this connection, I refer you to the thread on Score // Llull.
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@sarawolk that’s unfortunate, I understand your view. I was not pro approval until recently. In terms of RCV, I assume you mean IRV. I wish at least Tideman’s bottom two runoff were pushed instead. More ideally this would help avoid monotonicity failures but is probably too complicated: https://www.votingtheory.org/forum/topic/316/tideman-s-bottom-n-runoff?_=1716877581500
score-stratified-condorcet [10] cardinal-condorcet [9] ranked-condorcet [8] score [7] approval [6] ranked-bucklin [5] star [4] ranked-irv [3] ranked-borda [2] for-against [1] distribute [0] choose-one [0]
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@cfrank I say Ranked Voting to be more inclusive of ranked methods. (Ranked Choice/RCV is IRV and also sometimes STV).
Sidenote: Since advocates call IRV RCV, but academics and electoral theorists call it IRV, they have a firewall between the method and its scientific criticisms.
That's a problem and I strongly encourage us to all start calling it what they call it so the algorithms and search engines connect the two.
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@sarawolk you mean for us to use RCV instead of IRV? What do we call non-IRV ranked choice voting methods? I get that the onus is on us to make the alteration, but it’s actually both strange and quite annoying that IRV has presumptuously taken that title, as if other ranked choice voting methods don’t exist.
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@sarawolk said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
@cfrank I say Ranked Voting to be more inclusive of ranked methods. (Ranked Choice/RCV is IRV and also sometimes STV).
Sidenote: Since advocates call IRV RCV, but academics and electoral theorists call it IRV, they have a firewall between the method and its scientific criticisms.
That's a problem and I strongly encourage us to all start calling it what they call it so the algorithms and search engines connect the two.
I think a better compromise might be to call it IRV but mention that some people call it RCV in brackets, so it's still linked for search engine purposes.
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@toby-pereira The lay person audience is already more familiar with RCV than IRV, if you add in jargon (like Instant Runoff Voting/IRV) or even use multiple terms for the same thing, you lose people and use up cognitive load that you want to save for your actual points.
It's bad enough that there isn't a single clear term for Choose One Voting/ Plurality/FPTP.
My advice is to call the ranked ballot family of voting methods "Ranked Voting", call IRV "Ranked Choice Voting" and call FPTP "Choose One Voting".
In academic contexts, we should also use these common words but then have the technical names in parenthesis. The target audience for this stuff is groups like LWV who form non-expert volunteer committees to get up to speed and study reforms before making recommendations that carry massive weight.
This is another reason to not rebrand Approval, which already has a clear and self explanatory name.
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@toby-pereira said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
call it IRV but mention that some people call it RCV in brackets
I further qualify it "Hare".
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@jack-waugh said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
@k98kurz What you mean "combined"?
By "combined approval voting", I mean score voting with the options Disapprove (-1), Neutral (0), and Approve (+1); a candidate's score is the sum of "Approve" votes minus the sum of "Disapprove" votes. Iirc, I read that the Republic of Venice used CAV in its elections for around 500 years, though the name of the method is of much more recent origin.
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@k98kurz there are a few points to make about the Republic of Venice as it might compare to the situation we face now.
First, based on what I’m reading, it was mostly a hereditary, aristocratic oligarchy without broad-based democratic participation. It did not have a written constitution, or a formal bill of rights. Second, it was not a confederation of sovereign states but a centralized unitary government. Third, it had a much smaller and more homogenous population (in terms of culture) than the United States, which was spread out over far less land and simultaneously had a lower population density.
These things make it much easier for the small elite political class to settle affairs in whatever way they might agree upon amongst themselves, including using a chosen voting system. The political elite class was also much more highly educated than the rest of the population. When it comes to voting systems for us, there are strict laws and regulations that need to be satisfied, in addition to the need for support from a much more numerous and heterogeneous population, many of whom are relatively uneducated or misinformed, compounded with deliberate efforts against technical voting reform by our own political elite (and associated media). This is why I’m advocating for a simple reform, like approval voting. I’m also considering what @SaraWolk suggests, namely that another method like RCV (IRV) might be a more practical conduit for change, even though it is significantly less ideal.
score-stratified-condorcet [10] cardinal-condorcet [9] ranked-condorcet [8] score [7] approval [6] ranked-bucklin [5] star [4] ranked-irv [3] ranked-borda [2] for-against [1] distribute [0] choose-one [0]
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I'm just going to recenter that the entire basis of Approval as an effective and potentially-immediate compromise is that it doesn't require new ballots, machines, meaningfully different LEO procedures, noteworthy voter education, federal process certification, revised audit procedures, etc.
You just flip a switch. Uncheck the "discard overvotes" box, rewrite one sentence on the instructions line (in each language), and make sure the LEO guidance on tabulation reflects all this. The end. $0.
Extending the proposal to anything that actually requires a new ballot/process/everything defeats the entire point of the exercise. For that implementation cost, you could do practically any constitutionally valid single-winner system.
