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    Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise

    Election Policy and Reform
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    • L
      Lime @ChocoPi last edited by Lime

      @chocopi said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

      First, I'll point out that Fargo is raw Approval and St. Louis is Approval-into-Runoff. These behave very differently. (Hint: the latter is way better, and is basically STAR's twin brother.)

      Meanwhile, I'm extremely skeptical. The average number of approvals per ballot in St. Louis is way lower than in Fargo, and the approval curve is much less sharply-peaked. That suggests to me that some voters are turkey-raising. Though luckily, not enough are doing it for it something to have gone wrong… yet.

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      • J
        Jack Waugh @ChocoPi last edited by

        @chocopi said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

        But you can do even simpler and better than BTR. You just slap a Condorcet check on it, the end.

        Please lay this out as a separate topic.

        Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].

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        • J
          Jack Waugh @Lime last edited by

          @lime said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

          There's nothing really wrong with approval,

          I suggest that Approval makes it more work than necessary to vote responsibly as one has to resort to a stochastic technique.

          score,

          I suggest that Score makes it more work than necessary to vote responsibly as one has to exaggerate support for ones compromise candidate.

          or STAR

          Same as Score except that the candidates will come in pairs of near-clones.

          except that people heard about IRV first. As I've mentioned before, the easiest way to deal with that is to get a case to the Supreme Court that strikes down any nonmonotonic system as unconstitutional (a strategy that's already been used successfully in Germany).

          Then there goes Score-B2R.

          Approval-ordered Llull (letter grades) [10], Score // Llull [9], Score, STAR, Approval, other rated Condorcet [8]; equal-ranked Condorcet [4]; strictly-ranked Condorcet [3]; everything else [0].

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          • L
            Lime @Jack Waugh last edited by

            @jack-waugh said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

            I suggest that Approval makes it more work than necessary to vote responsibly as one has to resort to a stochastic technique.

            Mixed strategies can be optimal in any electoral system.

            @jack-waugh said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

            I suggest that Score makes it more work than necessary to vote responsibly as one has to exaggerate support for ones compromise candidate.

            …except, ironically, score makes randomization less important by letting you give partial scores instead of requiring you to vote at random.

            @jack-waugh said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

            Then there goes Score-B2R.

            That's fine. STAR, Smith//Score, ranked pairs, etc. are all probably good enough. IRV isn't.

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            • SaraWolk
              SaraWolk @cfrank last edited by

              @cfrank said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

              I’m also considering what @SaraWolk suggests, namely that another method like RCV (IRV) might be a more practical conduit for change, even though it is significantly less ideal.

              I'm not recommending RCV (IRV). I think it's oversold, broken, and extremely damaging to the voting reform movement.

              I recommend STAR, Approval, and Condorcet, and support a number of others.

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              • C
                cfrank @Jack Waugh last edited by

                @jack-waugh @ChocoPi in BTR, it is already impossible for a Condorcet winner to be eliminated, yes?

                score-stratified-condorcet [10] cardinal-condorcet [9] ranked-condorcet [8] score [7] approval [6] ranked-bucklin [5] star [4] ranked-irv [3] ranked-borda [2] for-against [1] distribute [0] choose-one [0]

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                  cfrank @SaraWolk last edited by

                  @sarawolk I see, I misunderstood your position and took my own cynicism too far. I agree that RCV(IRV) is damaging to reform efforts.

                  score-stratified-condorcet [10] cardinal-condorcet [9] ranked-condorcet [8] score [7] approval [6] ranked-bucklin [5] star [4] ranked-irv [3] ranked-borda [2] for-against [1] distribute [0] choose-one [0]

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                  • T
                    Toby Pereira @cfrank last edited by

                    @cfrank said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:

                    @jack-waugh @ChocoPi in BTR, it is already impossible for a Condorcet winner to be eliminated, yes?

                    That's what I thought, so sticking a Condorcet check on should make no difference.

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                    • ?
                      A Former User last edited by

                      Approval voting constantly gets attacked by Fairvote people who outright lie about it.

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                      • C
                        cfrank @Guest last edited by cfrank

                        @isocratia yeah that kind of thing really seems counterproductive, and strange.

                        score-stratified-condorcet [10] cardinal-condorcet [9] ranked-condorcet [8] score [7] approval [6] ranked-bucklin [5] star [4] ranked-irv [3] ranked-borda [2] for-against [1] distribute [0] choose-one [0]

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