@lime said in STLR - Score Than Leveled Runoff might not be too complex for voters:

... So then shouldn't we be encouraging voters to give preferences as close to honesty as possible, to make sure we have as little error as possible?

No, in my opinion, we shouldn't. That's asking them to play the sucker, in the presence of a voting system that can get, I think, the right answer in case no party plays sucker. The proper use of Score Voting is to apply a tactic to maximize the expected value of the outcome. And I doubt whether STAR behaves significantly differently. It's just extra complexity for no gain.

@jack-waugh said in STLR - Score Than Leveled Runoff might not be too complex for voters:

"Honest voting" is a theoretical concept that can be useful in thought experiments and reasoning and the design of algorithms, etc. However, it does not describe a phenomenon that can happen in real elections in which something important rides on the outcome of the tally.

$20 says it does.

How are we going to test that? With the voters experiencing how many elections where the outcome matters to them? And how are we going to measure the importance of an election?

@jack-waugh said in STLR - Score Than Leveled Runoff might not be too complex for voters:

What grounds do you have for coming to such an opinion? I don't think it is correct.

I think that's just the definition of the "best result" under a given metric. Regardless of what social welfare function you pick, that social welfare function will be maximized if voters are honest.

What do you care about? Electing majority winners? A Condorcet method will always elect a Condorcet winner if voters are honest (but not necessarily if they're dishonest). Maximizing social utility? Score voting does that with honest voters (but not always for dishonest voters). Maximizing the number of voters who see their favorite candidate elected? FPP does that with honest voters (but once again, can't with dishonest ones).

No matter which social welfare function you come up with, that social welfare function will do better at its job if it has accurate information than if it has inaccurate information.

The input doesn't have to be accurate information about what the voters want. It suffices, in the case of Score Voting, if it is accurate information about the voter's tactical choice. If just one side votes "honestly" and the other is trying to maximize value, the result will be wrong and will skew to the side that is using the tactic. However, I contend that when all sides are using their respective best tactic, the "pull" balances out and the result will be the same as though all were "honest". The reason to think this is that the system is additive and balanced.

To paraphrase WDS: consider a voting system in which a vote consists of 32 bits. The tally takes the XOR of the ballots and then takes the result modulo the count of candidates to get the index of the winning candidate. How do I cast an "honest" vote in this system?

@lime said in Simple anti-chicken modifications to score:

I promise you that nobody in the election-methods mailing list is particularly positive on IRV.

Yes, I have noticed that.

Most of the support for IRV is from the Alaskan model (Top Four & Final Five) proponents and their ally Fair Vote.

Fair Vote is promoting Proportional Racked Choice Voting in the Fair Representation Act (Rep. Donald Beyer, D-VA-8).

The Fair Representation Act (FRA) calls for Ranked Proportional Voting (SVT), FairVote claims:

"It’s straightforward for voters: Rank candidates in order of choice. Voters can rank as many candidates as they want, without fear that doing so will hurt their favorite candidate’s chances. Ranking a backup choice will never hurt a voter’s favorite candidate, so voters have no reason to vote for only one candidate."

This year's version of the FRA includes provisions for states with blanket primaries.

As with previous versions, FRA protects Voting Right Act of 1965 set aside districts. Frankly I think fair voting systems, especially proportional representation, will help minorities far more than set aside districts. Set aside districts are perceived by Republicans as a perfectly legitimate excuse to gerrymander like all hell.

The FairVote FRA pages give the impression the the chief purpose of proportional representation is to get more people of color, women, LGBTQ candidates elected.

To get Proportional Representation enacted we will need support from a good number of conservatives and Republicans. We should sell voting system reforms as color blind (they are), and fair. They will help minority representation by virtue of being color blind.

The FRA is now in committee, the speaker will decide when to let it out of committee, smart money is on never.

@lime said in MDD//Score:

eliminate any candidate who would lose in a runoff

If that's what it amounts to, then maybe a restatement of the definition in terms of predicting such a runoff would make the definition easier to read for a broad and skeptical audience.

@chocopi said in New voting method: Linear medians:

As part of an experiment to see if it's possible for the Democrats to hate someone more than Trump, or just to set a Guinness World Record for biggest political career implosion?

I didn't say it would be a good idea. As I mentioned, he'd have no hope, since voters are using the primary to settle on an equilibrium. The question is whether Democrats have a gun to their head that would keep them from voting for Buttigieg's third-party, even if Biden looked hopeless.

@chocopi said in New voting method: Linear medians:

I agree more with you that these edge cases can plausibly be disregarded. The very idea of anyone executing a pushover strategy is absurd--you would need exact polling, exact coordination, no counter-strategy, and face a worst-case backfire if you get any of that wrong.

I don't think voters supporting a pushover is where this really falls apart. The problem with Tideman's framework is the strategies he finds are often:

Individually unstable, and therefore couldn't occur with strategic voters. You need voters to do things like betray a favorite, even though that favorite has a good shot at winning. Sometimes they're impossible to pull off with imperfect coordination (improper equilibria, i.e. trembling-hands rule them out). Prosocial or neutral—FPP has lots of opportunities for strategy, which is a good thing, because without strategy it turns into a random lottery. Easily countered by basic defensive strategy.

Every voting system has strategy. The real concern is whether voters playing their optimal strategy creates a bad result, e.g. a turkey winning. After all, in Borda, the Strong Nash equilibrium is still the Condorcet winner, but that doesn't happen in real elections. The reason Borda is bad is because the only proper equilibrium ends up selecting a winner at random.

In Benham's method, optimal strategy looks like a center-squeeze, because whenever you have a center-squeeze setup, the largest faction can bury the Condorcet winner and elect a candidate on the wings. (That's especially true if the wings tend to be overconfident.) By contrast, in cardinal methods, the optimal strategy looks like, well, the Condorcet winner being elected.

I'd like to clarify that I think party strategy does play a huge role in FPP, IRV, or Condorcet elections, because strategy is either too complex for typical voters or there are many equilibria (and voters have to coordinate on just one). In these specific situations, voters have to follow instructions on voting cards issued by their party. In approval or score, any idiot with a pulse can work out that your best strategy is to give as many points as possible to the best frontrunner.

@chocopi said in New voting method: Linear medians:

Baldwin's is a ying-yang similarity, a method that is practically only impacted by said esoteric NP-hard strategies. (Simple compromise-burial does almost nothing.) These non-trivial Baldwin strategies are the hardest to calculate of any method, even with perfect [everything]. I think it's a fair and interesting academic question to quantify these, but I'd also raise an eyebrow (or two) at anyone listing them as a point against Baldwin's.

This is a good example of why "NP-hard"ness results are not very useful in practice. What matters is what happens if voters execute their ideal strategy. For Baldwin's method, the strategy is an absolute disaster, just like for Borda: it ends in a turkey winning with high probability.

In practice, elections have 2-5 viable candidates, so even "NP-hard" manipulation is trivial in practice. If you have just 2 candidates and a turkey, Baldwin is Borda-with-runoff, with a simple strategy: bury the leader to make sure they can't make it out of the first round. Does this have a shot of backfiring? Yes. (It has a good shot of picking a turkey, in fact.) But at its core, it's still Borda, and has the same result.

@gregw I think this is sensible, I would fully support it if it could be shown to stand up to formal legal scrutiny, in the sense of constitutionality. I’m not a constitutional scholar by any means, it would be advantageous to have this kind of language drafted by a competent team of constitutional lawyers if possible (if it wasn’t already). My concern is the same as before, that if it’s not very carefully approached, it could lead to rulings that become very prohibitive to reform efforts. The less possibility of any kind of constitutional challenge, the (very much) better.

@jack-waugh said in On one-sided strategy:

@lime said in On one-sided strategy:

@jack-waugh said in On one-sided strategy:

Give your favorites the top score and your most hated the bottom score. If you have a compromise candidate, and if you are convinced that your favorites are very unpopular or unknown, exaggerate the score of the compromise candidate almost up to the next higher candidates, but not quite up to them.

In practice, this is the same as thresholding, assuming you rate your compromise close enough to perfect.

What you mean, "rate"? In my heart, or on my ballot?

On your ballot.

We who want to eliminate vote-splitting and spoiler effects have grounds to choose a system that the public can easily understand. Does anyone think this system passes muster in that regard?

Just bumping this again. Since cycle removal works quite cleanly for 3 candidates, you could have a STAR-type method where the top 3 by score go into the run-off instead of 2, and with the top 3, you then remove cycles and find the Condorcet winner.

Alternatively you might want to come up with a cloneproof measure to find the top 3, perhaps similar to the score excess method that I posted here, based on Chris Benham's approval opposition.

@cfrank @Jack-Waugh Drumming short slogans without clear definition or explanation can be problematic. Even "one ballot per voter" could lead to people insisting that all offices and questions, up for vote on the same day being crammed on one sheet of paper. Or originalist judges going back to little ball used for secret voting as the definition of ballot. We need to remind people that a vote: is the opinion of one member of a group, used in an effort to determine the opinion of the group, on a matter that they are trying to make a decision upon. The more often people are exposed to longer explanations of what a vote is, the less they will assume a narrow definition based on exposer to only one voting method.