Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise
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@jack-waugh said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
@k98kurz What you mean "combined"?
By "combined approval voting", I mean score voting with the options Disapprove (-1), Neutral (0), and Approve (+1); a candidate's score is the sum of "Approve" votes minus the sum of "Disapprove" votes. Iirc, I read that the Republic of Venice used CAV in its elections for around 500 years, though the name of the method is of much more recent origin.
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@k98kurz there are a few points to make about the Republic of Venice as it might compare to the situation we face now.
First, based on what I’m reading, it was mostly a hereditary, aristocratic oligarchy without broad-based democratic participation. It did not have a written constitution, or a formal bill of rights. Second, it was not a confederation of sovereign states but a centralized unitary government. Third, it had a much smaller and more homogenous population (in terms of culture) than the United States, which was spread out over far less land and simultaneously had a lower population density.
These things make it much easier for the small elite political class to settle affairs in whatever way they might agree upon amongst themselves, including using a chosen voting system. The political elite class was also much more highly educated than the rest of the population. When it comes to voting systems for us, there are strict laws and regulations that need to be satisfied, in addition to the need for support from a much more numerous and heterogeneous population, many of whom are relatively uneducated or misinformed, compounded with deliberate efforts against technical voting reform by our own political elite (and associated media). This is why I’m advocating for a simple reform, like approval voting. I’m also considering what @SaraWolk suggests, namely that another method like RCV (IRV) might be a more practical conduit for change, even though it is significantly less ideal.
score-stratified-condorcet [10] cardinal-condorcet [9] ranked-condorcet [8] score [7] approval [6] ranked-bucklin [5] star [4] ranked-irv [3] ranked-borda [2] for-against [1] distribute [0] choose-one [0]
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I'm just going to recenter that the entire basis of Approval as an effective and potentially-immediate compromise is that it doesn't require new ballots, machines, meaningfully different LEO procedures, noteworthy voter education, federal process certification, revised audit procedures, etc.
You just flip a switch. Uncheck the "discard overvotes" box, rewrite one sentence on the instructions line (in each language), and make sure the LEO guidance on tabulation reflects all this. The end. $0.
Extending the proposal to anything that actually requires a new ballot/process/everything defeats the entire point of the exercise. For that implementation cost, you could do practically any constitutionally valid single-winner system.
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@chocopi said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
$0.
I think we all know this figure is missing a few zeroes. /s
More importantly, this still leaves the issue of the Electoral College. How would we translate the EC district votes into EC votes under this system? Approval voting would be an immediate improvement for electing Congress Critters and state/local officials, but at some point we'll have to think through how to reform the Electoral College. The way I see it, abolishing the EC is too radical a proposition to have associated with any advocacy for an Approval Voting reform, so a plausible idea for how the EC could work is worth having. Simply leaving the EC the way it is while selecting Electors using Approval Voting would probably lead to more problems.
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This is sort of a seperate question, even if it is a logical next one.
Think of it this way: We are talking about electing legislators with a new voting system. We are not talking about the legislators using a new voting system to vote on bills. That might also be a good idea, but it's an entirely seperate matter.
The electoral college is similar. Each electorate elects a (single) desired target for their state's delegation to vote for. We're not talking about how the delegations themselves vote. That might also be a good idea, but it's an entirely seperate matter.
Of course, there is more reason to address the latter than the former; legislature are deliberative bodies, while the Electoral College as currently set up is basically not. But the point is they are legally and functionally an independent system. In both examples, there is little reason for the representative body to conduct itself in the exact same way as the preceeding public vote.
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Even though Approval is simplest and least costly to implement once the decision is made to do so, the decision still has to be made, and that requires convincing people that a change is worthwhile. Probably all of us who participate here agree that the effect on politics of putting Approval in place for important offices would be revolutionary, but as a marketing presentation, Approval might not look as shiny as Score-B2R. Of the reforms that have been enacted, Hare has been tried the most times, and Approval exists only in two localities and only for municipal elections. Either flash sells, or the money and propaganda support made the difference. Maybe our best marketing strategy is to try slide B2R IRV rating-ballots into the place of Hare IRV RCV in popular mindshare as a solution with the same flash but without the disappointing and counterintuitive results that Hare often delivers.
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First, I'll point out that Fargo is raw Approval and St. Louis is Approval-into-Runoff. These behave very differently. (Hint: the latter is way better, and is basically STAR's twin brother.)
Second, I am in complete agreement that the best path forward is simple improvements to IRV.
But you can do even simplier and better than BTR. You just slap a Condorcet check on it, the end.
Your ballots are now precinct summable and monotonic outside of cycles. The results are incredibly straightforward, ("Here's how much the winner beats everyone else by:") yet it also produces a complete pairwise matrix for any campaigns or political scientists who want it. It's 100% Condorcet efficient; no more center-squeeze, maximimally resistant to polarization. It's fully cloneproof.
And best of all, it exhibits the highest strategy resistance of any method. (Only Baldwin's comes close.)
BTR is good, but it should be regarded as strictly inferior to the more straightforward Condorcet//Hare alternatives unless you are somehow at a loss for computational speed.
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@jack-waugh said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
Maybe our best marketing strategy is to try slide B2R IRV rating-ballots into the place of Hare IRV RCV in popular mindshare as a solution with the same flash but without the disappointing and counterintuitive results that Hare often delivers.
People have been trying this for as long as IRV has been proposed. The answer to "why does IRV keep gianing ground" is "because billionaires keep pouring money into FairVote and FairVote keeps lying about IRV".
There's nothing really wrong with approval, score, or STAR except that people heard about IRV first. As I've mentioned before, the easiest way to deal with that is to get a case to the Supreme Court that strikes down any nonmonotonic system as unconstitutional (a strategy that's already been used successfully in Germany).
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@chocopi said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
First, I'll point out that Fargo is raw Approval and St. Louis is Approval-into-Runoff. These behave very differently. (Hint: the latter is way better, and is basically STAR's twin brother.)
Meanwhile, I'm extremely skeptical. The average number of approvals per ballot in St. Louis is way lower than in Fargo, and the approval curve is much less sharply-peaked. That suggests to me that some voters are turkey-raising. Though luckily, not enough are doing it for it something to have gone wrong… yet.
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@chocopi said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
But you can do even simpler and better than BTR. You just slap a Condorcet check on it, the end.
Please lay this out as a separate topic.
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@lime said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
There's nothing really wrong with approval,
I suggest that Approval makes it more work than necessary to vote responsibly as one has to resort to a stochastic technique.
score,
I suggest that Score makes it more work than necessary to vote responsibly as one has to exaggerate support for ones compromise candidate.
or STAR
Same as Score except that the candidates will come in pairs of near-clones.
except that people heard about IRV first. As I've mentioned before, the easiest way to deal with that is to get a case to the Supreme Court that strikes down any nonmonotonic system as unconstitutional (a strategy that's already been used successfully in Germany).
Then there goes Score-B2R.
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@jack-waugh said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
I suggest that Approval makes it more work than necessary to vote responsibly as one has to resort to a stochastic technique.
Mixed strategies can be optimal in any electoral system.
@jack-waugh said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
I suggest that Score makes it more work than necessary to vote responsibly as one has to exaggerate support for ones compromise candidate.
…except, ironically, score makes randomization less important by letting you give partial scores instead of requiring you to vote at random.
@jack-waugh said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
Then there goes Score-B2R.
That's fine. STAR, Smith//Score, ranked pairs, etc. are all probably good enough. IRV isn't.
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@cfrank said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
I’m also considering what @SaraWolk suggests, namely that another method like RCV (IRV) might be a more practical conduit for change, even though it is significantly less ideal.
I'm not recommending RCV (IRV). I think it's oversold, broken, and extremely damaging to the voting reform movement.
I recommend STAR, Approval, and Condorcet, and support a number of others.
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@jack-waugh @ChocoPi in BTR, it is already impossible for a Condorcet winner to be eliminated, yes?
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@sarawolk I see, I misunderstood your position and took my own cynicism too far. I agree that RCV(IRV) is damaging to reform efforts.
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@cfrank said in Approval Voting as a Workable Compromise:
@jack-waugh @ChocoPi in BTR, it is already impossible for a Condorcet winner to be eliminated, yes?
That's what I thought, so sticking a Condorcet check on should make no difference.
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Approval voting constantly gets attacked by Fairvote people who outright lie about it.
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@isocratia yeah that kind of thing really seems counterproductive, and strange.
