Topics created by Jack Waugh

Who knows how the Gibbard theorem applies to ABC voting? In optimizing my vote, how do I take into account the stances of the other voters? Assume I know them perfectly. Do I maybe exaggerate support for a compromise candidate from D to C, with a metered probability?

@cfrank @Jack-Waugh Drumming short slogans without clear definition or explanation can be problematic. Even "one ballot per voter" could lead to people insisting that all offices and questions, up for vote on the same day being crammed on one sheet of paper. Or originalist judges going back to little ball used for secret voting as the definition of ballot. We need to remind people that a vote: is the opinion of one member of a group, used in an effort to determine the opinion of the group, on a matter that they are trying to make a decision upon. The more often people are exposed to longer explanations of what a vote is, the less they will assume a narrow definition based on exposer to only one voting method.

@jack-waugh This seems to be a very abstract proof of something that doesn't even seem to be true - an ordinal voting system can't be continuous, respect anonymity and unanimity. At the end of the video he asks about an election (using FPTP) used to elect a pizza topping. He says he personally thinks the most likely condition to fail is continuity. He personally thinks? I mean, does it? I'd say that by any reasonable definition of continuity, FPTP doesn't fail. You don't get any weird jumps in the result after changing one vote, like you might do in a Condorcet method if e.g. a cycle suddenly appears or gets broken. You wouldn't get any discontinuities in the Borda count either.

Edit - Just looking at the comments, people are talking about how any change in a vote is a discrete jump so it's not continuous in that respect, but that much is obvious from the start.

@toby-pereira said in Promoting Plain Score:

I don't see how adding half marks is simpler than doubling the range of integers.

If you have individual bubbles for 0-10, fitting all of them on one piece of paper gets hard. In addition, finding the bubble you want to use is hard.

The main distinction is between ≤6 bubbles (subitization range) vs. >6 bubbles. For more than 6 bubbles, finding the bubble you want requires a "search", which is mentally costly and discourages intermediate ratings (which are more complex).

Usually this is handled by breaking the problem down into two subitization steps. This makes finding the best bubble easy, and also makes it easy for voters who don't want that extra precision to ignore it.

Thanks for the cross-reference.

@lime said in What Multiwinner Method To Push For Local Boards?:

@toby-pereira said in What Multiwinner Method To Push For Local Boards?:

Well, SPAV is purely approval whereas SPAV + KP is scores, so which ends up being more proportional might depend on exactly how you define proportional and also how people vote in practice. There's always been the question with score voting of whether some voters will lose out by casting a more honest ballot but losing out strategically.

Thus my question in another thread, about whether Harmonic voting might lose the stable winner set properties of PAV. The stable winner set seems like it could provide some very strong strategy-resistance properties, similar to Condorcet in single-winner elections.

I don't think its strategy resistance is as strong as it would be with ranked ballots. With approval voting, you still have to decide whether to approve candidates you don't like as much because you think they've got a better chance of being elected.

Schulze STV uses ranked ballots and reduces to the Schulze Condorcet method in the single-winner case. It's probably more strategically robust than an approval-based method that satisfies core stability.

I think it does a good job of refudiating the advertised benefits of RCV-Hare.

@jack-waugh

The Alliance for Just Money may interest you.

Their program:

Require Congress to be the sole creator of all U.S. money debt-free.
End the privilege of commercial banks to create money.
Transfer all remaining operations of the Fed to the U.S. Treasury.

Government creation of new money will be limited by an independent public agency whose only function is to determine how much new money, if any, should be issued each year (or withdrawn), adhering to a mandate to keep the purchasing power of money stable.

This agency’s decisions will be based on economic data (most of which is already being collected) and citizen input. How that new money is spent, invested, given, or lent is up to Congress, which has the constitutional responsibility not only for creating our money but also for allocating federal government spending.

Don't know if it would work, but it would give capitalists conniptions.

https://www.monetaryalliance.org/

We who want to eliminate vote-splitting and spoiler effects have grounds to choose a system that the public can easily understand. Does anyone think this system passes muster in that regard?

@jack-waugh I don’t know much about PR, but this is an attempt to balance seats by considering party affiliations without stuffing clones. Can PR be improved with “Cake Cutting” incentives?

@jack-waugh said in Condorcet // Score:

@toby-pereira said in Condorcet // Score:

Under Condorcet//Score, the winner could be a candidate outside the top cycle.

But she would be the Score winner, so not a bad outcome.

Not necessarily a bad outcome in its own right, but it makes the method more discontinuous than it needs to be. A candidate who isn't in the running can suddenly win because those that are in the running get too close to each other.

I know some of you will have seen that on EM, there has just been a poll of single-winner systems. Ranked Pairs with winning votes won the poll as the Condorcet winner and most approved. The margins version of Ranked Pairs wasn't in the poll though, so they weren't compared. See here and here for a breakdown.

Plurality has a spli- vote problem, which is why we need a Progressive Primary. But, lacking that, the Green Party & their nominee are the obvious natural combining point for Progressive votes

…& any forum that includes voting strategy doesn’t need to avoid voting-strategy specifics.

Tally in Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0}:

(Ossipoff + Waugh = total)

same order as I listed the nominees

100 + 100 = 200 Approval 100 + 000 = 100 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking allowed 000 + 099 = 099 STAR 001 + 100 = 101 Score{2, 1, 0} 050 + 099 = 149 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0} 050 + 100 = 150 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0} 000 + 001 = 001 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked pairs, winning votes 000 + 090 = 090 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot) 000 + 000 = 000 quantile-normalized score, with integer scores from 0 to 100 000 + 100 = 100 0-9 score

Reorder by descending totals:

100 + 100 = 200 Approval 050 + 100 = 150 Score{5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0} 050 + 099 = 149 Score{100, 99, 90, 50, 10, 1, 0} 001 + 100 = 101 Score{2, 1, 0} 100 + 000 = 100 Ranked-Pairs(winning-votes) equal-ranking allowed 000 + 100 = 100 0-9 score 000 + 099 = 099 STAR 000 + 090 = 090 Smith//Score (0 to 9 ballot) 000 + 001 = 001 0 to 9 scale (only used for ranking), ranked pairs, winning votes 000 + 000 = 000 quantile-normalized score, with integer scores from 0 to 100

Approval beats the runner-up by 25%, he exclaimed.

@cfrank said in Arguing for Equality:

lol

I wish it were a laughing matter. I judge that this exact PD has caused political decisions that put the state of humanity, the state of the artifacts that some humans control, and the state of the environment such that an analogy of a train speeding toward a bombed-out bridge over the Danube holds true, and the momentum may be such that no measures that can possibly be recruited will suffice to save anyone.